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1 Introduction
Motivated by the fact that the identities of the bidders are lacking to the econo-
metrician in some auction data either because this information is confidential or have
been lost, or because submissions are structurally anonymous as in internet auctions,
we consider a setup where bidders’ identities are not -or partially- observed by the
econometrician. At first glance, anonymity reduces considerably the scope of the
economic analysis and invites the econometrician to assume that bidders are ex ante
symmetric.1 Furthermore, the presence of asymmetries has been the key determi-
nant of many empirical studies of auction data. In Porter and Zona [32, 33] and
Pesendorfer [31], the bidding behavior of alleged cartel participants is compared to
the ones of non-cartel bidders through reduced form approaches. In Hendricks and
Porter [12], neighbor firms are shown to be better informed in auctions for drainage
leases. The aim of this paper is to lay the foundations of the econometric of auctions
under anonymous data and to show how we can deal with asymmetric models. We
adopt the so-called structural approach without any parametric assumptions (see
Paarsch and Hong [30]) and focus on private value single-unit auction models.
First, we adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous
bids by requiring the unique characterization of bidders’ primitives up to a per-
mutation of bidders’ identities. Then, in the spirit of Laffont and Vuong [16] we
explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify private
value models in standard auctions with risk neutral buyers. We show in Proposition
3.1 that anonymity prevents the identification of the asymmetric affiliated private
value model, contrary to Campo et al. [7]’s analysis when bidders’ identities are ob-
served by the econometrician. When the identities of the bidders are not observed,
the method that is currently implemented is to assume symmetry as an identifying
restriction and to develop Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong [10]’s nonparametric method-
ology (henceforth GPV). The validity of this method relies on the assumption that
bidders are symmetric, an assumption that can not be rejected on any testable restric-
tion without further restrictions if bids are fully anonymous. However, for auction
models that explicitly involve asymmetries -e.g. with collusion or shill bidding- or if
1See Song [36] and Sailer [34] for eBay auction models with symmetric bidders. Thus those
models exclude any shill bidding activity from the seller, a pervasive phenomenon that is analyzed
in Lamy [17, 18] respectively for models with pure private values and participation costs and models
with interdependent values.
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the econometrician knows that the main feature of the underlying market is asym-
metries between bidders, this identification route is not appropriate. We propose
another identification route. We show in Proposition 3.1 that the asymmetric inde-
pendent private value (IPV) model is identified. One crucial step in the resolution of
this inverse problem is to recover the underlying cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) (FB∗i )i=1,··· ,N of each buyers’ bids from the CDFs (FBp)p=1,··· ,N of the order
statistics of the bids. By exploiting independence, the vector of the N bidders CDFs
(FB∗i )i=1,··· ,N corresponds to the roots of a polynomial of degree N whose coefficients
are linear combinations of the CDFs (FBp)p=1,··· ,N .
Second, we propose a multi-step kernel-based estimation procedure to recover the
underlying distributions of bidders’ private values. We mainly adapt GPV’s nonpara-
metric two-stage estimation procedure.2 We establish the uniform consistency of our
estimator. In the first price auction, this latter reaches the same rate of convergence
as the one derived in GPV with nonanonymous bids and that was shown to attain the
best rate of uniform convergence for estimating the latent density of private values
from observed bids in the symmetric IPV model. In the second price auction, our
estimator also reaches the optimal rate of uniform convergence under nonanonymous
bids. Our estimation procedure is also tailored to setups where the econometrician
may benefit from some additional information as the identity of the winner or the
identities of the two highest bidders, e.g. in timber auction data (Li and Perrigne
[22], Baldwin et al. [3]). In those latter cases, we know from Athey and Haile [2] that
the asymmetric IPV model is identified only through the observation of the highest
bid and the identity of the highest bidder. Nevertheless, the existing nonparametric
methodology generalizing GPV and that only uses the highest bidding statistics may
not perform very well in small data sets. In particular, in the second stage of GPV’s
estimation procedure, the pseudo-values are computed only for those bids that are
not anonymous in such a ‘naive’ approach. On the contrary, our estimation proce-
dure uses the complete vector of bids at both stages. In particular, we obtain for
each bid a pseudo private value according to each possible identities of the bidder.
2Our nonparametric estimator can also be useful with regards to parametric procedures, i.e.
that specify parametric families of distributions and solve by brute force a maximization program,
insofar as it provides a consistent initial point for the maximization. Moreover, the EM-algorithm
flavor of our multi-step procedure can be adapted in parametric frameworks -as for maximum
likelihood estimation- and thus alleviate the computational burden. See McLachlan and Krishnan
[26] for a comprehensive treatment of EM-algorithms.
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Then, to estimate the distribution of private values, we should estimate for each bid
the probability that it comes from a given bidder.
Third we consider how to test for symmetry. In a first step, we present the
theoretical restrictions corresponding to symmetry between some bidders: we apply
recent research in applied mathematics [41] which gives an explicit criterion for the
determination of the number and multiplicities of the real/imaginary roots of a poly-
nomial based on a Complete Discrimination System, i.e. a set of explicit expressions
in terms of the coefficients of the corresponding polynomial. This system provides a
basic framework in order to test for any symmetry structure between the bidders. In
a second step, we propose a statistical test to test the assumption that all bidders are
ex-ante symmetric against the alternative that at least two bidders are not symmet-
ric. The asymptotic theory is developed: our testing statistic converges in Root-N to
a Gaussian distribution which is centered at zero (at a strictly positive real number)
under the null (resp. under the alternative). We analyze how the power of the test
is related to the underlying asymmetry in the data.
In a nutshell, we face two identification routes with fully anonymous data: either
to assume symmetry and to apply GPV’s method allowing for correlated signals
as in Li et al. [23] or to assume independence but not symmetry and to apply
ours. Furthermore, with partially anonymous data, our methodology competes with
nonparametric alternatives that also assumes independence, in particular ‘naive’ ap-
proaches that throw away the bids that are anonymous. Contrary to those latter
approaches, our procedure exploits all bids and also the partial information about
bidders’ identities. As it is strongly supported by our Monte Carlo simulations, our
procedure is a striking improvement, especially for small data sets where ‘naive’
approaches are useless.
With respect to the econometric literature, our contribution is severalfold. First,
whereas Athey and Haile [2] consider nonparametric identification with incomplete
sets of bids -which is structurally the case in some auction formats as the Dutch and
English auctions, we go further by considering that the observation with respect to a
bid itself may also be incomplete insofar as the identity of the bidder may lack to the
econometrician. Our analysis is also tailored to the case where the econometrician
does not observe a leading discrete covariate that is creating asymmetry between bid-
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ders.3 Second, we propose a nonparametric estimation procedure that corresponds
to a natural extension of GPV’s procedure and analyze its asymptotic properties
according to the same criteria as in GPV. Third a test for symmetry is proposed,
which is distribution-free in the case without covariates. The anonymous nature of
the data prevents the use of standard symmetry tests (see Hollander and Wolfe [13]).4
Finally this work can be viewed as belonging to the general problem of unobserved
heterogeneity in econometrics. The bulk of the existing works are considering mod-
els where a single outcome suffers from two kind of noises: a standard idiosyncatric
noise and a noise which corresponds to some underlying unobserved heterogeneity
among the individuals and that can receive some direct interpretation. Identification
is obtained usually from the combination of some parametric specifications and/or
additivity structure as in finite mixture distributions (see Titterington [38]) or in
the mixed proportional hazard model (see van den Berg [39]). In the present con-
tribution, the key element for the identification of the unobserved heterogeneity is
the observation of multiple outcomes. In this vein, Li and Vuong [24] consider a
deconvolution problem with multiple indicators without assuming any parametric
assumption on the underlying (continuous) noises in an additive error model which
has been applied in the empirical auction literature by Krasnokutskaya [15]. Our
model is of a different nature: we impose no restriction on the distribution of the
idiosyncratic types conditionally on the unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. no additivity
structure is required), however the unobserved heterogeneity is of a discrete nature,
the fundamental point which drives identification with multiple indicators.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and the
definition of identifiability under anonymity. In Section 3, we consider nonparametric
identification. For the asymmetric IPV model which is identified and allowing for
heterogeneity across auctions and variations in the set of participants, we develop
a multi-step kernel-based estimator in section 4 where the new caveats resulting
from anonymity are presented. In section 5, general testing principles are presented
and the statistical theory of a test for full symmetry is derived. In section 6, we
establish the asymptotic properties of our estimation procedure. Section 7 illustrates
3E.g. the location of the firms in Flambard and Perrigne [8]). A rejection of symmetry with our
test would invite the econometrician to collect more covariates.
4Testing issues in the auction literature are mainly devoted to test for common values. See Haile
et al. [11] for a nonparametric treatment.
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the usefulness of our methodology with some Monte Carlo simulations. Section 8
concludes by indicating some future lines of research. Most proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an auction of a single indivisible good with n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bid-
ders. We consider the first and second price sealed-bid auctions with no reserve
price and when all bids are collected by the econometrician.5 Nevertheless, if the
econometrician can observe the amounts submitted by all bidders, we assume that
bids are anonymous, i.e. she can not observe their corresponding identities. Hence,
she observes the ordered vector of bids B = (B1, · · · , Bp, · · · , Bn), where Bp de-
notes the pth order statistic of the vector of bids B. But she does not observe
B∗ = (B∗1 , · · · , B∗i , · · · , B∗n), where B∗i denotes the amount submitted by bidder i.
Subsequently, we use the indices i, j for bidders’ identities and p, r for bidding order
statistics.
We consider the private value paradigm: each participant i = 1, · · · , n is assumed
to have a private value xi for the auctioned object. Hence, bidder i would receive
utility xi−p from winning the object at price p. In the first and second price auctions,
the price p is equal to Bn and Bn−1, respectively. Let FXi(.) and FX(.) denote the
cumulative distribution functions of Xi and X = (X1, · · · , Xn), respectively, which
are assumed to be absolutely continuous with probability density functions (PDF)
fXi(.) and fX(.) and compact support [x, x] and [x, x]n, respectively.6,7 Each bidder
is privately informed about xi, whereas the common distribution FX(.) is assumed
to be common knowledge among bidders. When we refer to models with symmetric
bidders we assume that the joint distribution of X is exchangeable with respect to
buyers’ indices. On the other hand, when we treat models allowing asymmetric
bidders we drop the exchangeability assumption. For a generic random variable S
5How to extend our methodology with risk-aversed bidders, with binding reserve prices and with
incomplete sets of bids is discussed in section 8.
6Throughout, uppercase letters are used for distributions, while lowercase letters are used for
densities. We also follow the standard notation by using an uppercase letter for a statistic and the
corresponding lowercase letter for its realization.
7We restrict ourselves to the common-support case that guarantees that almost all bids are
‘serious’ bids, i.e. win with a strictly positive probability. Otherwise identification is obtained only
for ‘serious’ types. See Lebrun [20] for the analysis of the first-price auction with different supports.
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and a class of events E, we denote respectively FS|E(.|e) and fS|E(.|e) the CDF and
PDF of S conditionally on an event e in E. Our analysis falls into two classes of
models:
Independent Private Values (IPV): FX(x) =
∏n
i=1 FXi(xi).
Strictly Affiliated Private Value (APV): ∂
2 log fX(x)
∂xi∂xj
≥  > 0 for i 6= j if fX(x) > 0
Assumption A 1 The joint density fX is bounded, atomless and strictly positive
on [x, x]n.
We restrict attention to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in weakly undominated pure
strategies, denoted by (β1(.), · · · , βn(.)), where βi(.) is the bidding function of bidder
i. In the equilibrium of the second price auction, buyers are thus bidding their private
value. Hence, the link between bids and private types is straightforward:
xi = bi ≡ ξndi (bi, FB) (1)
In the first price auction, under assumption (1), Athey [1] guarantees the existence
of an increasing pure strategy equilibrium in the IPV and APV models. The link
between bids and types for each bidder i is made by a standard rewriting of the first
order differential equation derived from bidder i’s optimization program:
xi = bi +
FB∗−i|B∗i (bi|bi)
fB∗−i|B∗i (bi|bi)
≡ ξrsti (bi, FB), (2)
where B∗−i denotes the maximum of the bids from bidder i’s opponents.
Following Laffont and Vuong [16], we extend the literature on identification of
private value models to the case where bids are anonymous. On the one hand, if
bidders’ identities are observed, then identifiability corresponds to the condition that,
if two possible underlying distributions FX(.) and F ′X(.) of private signals lead to the
same distribution of bids FB∗(.), then it follows that FX(.) and F ′X(.) are equal. On
the other hand, the following definition introduces the notion of identifiability that
makes sense under anonymity.
Definition 1 (Identifiability under anonymity) Under anonymous bidding, an
auction model is said to be identifiable if for two possible underlying distributions
FX(.) and F ′X(.) of private values leading to the same distribution of bids FB(.),
then it follows that FX(.) and F ′X(.) are equal up to a permutation of the potential
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buyers, i.e. there exists a permutation pi : [1, n]→ [1, n] such that FX(x1, · · · , xn) =
F ′X(xpi(1), · · · , xpi(n)) for almost any vector of types X.
Our definition of identifiability corresponds to the possibility of recovering an
anonymous joint distribution of buyers’ private values. Note that this information
is not sufficient with asymmetric PV models for the computation of the optimal
mechanism à la Myerson [28] that requires the knowledge of bidders’ identities. Nev-
ertheless, it is sufficient for the computation of the optimal anonymous mechanism
or the optimal reserve price in a standard auction.
3 Nonparametric Identification
Anonymity restricts the degree of information of the data and thus it can only re-
duce the identification possibilities. In particular we show that asymmetric affiliated
private value models are not identified on the contrary to Campo et al. [7]’s identi-
fication result in a framework where bidders’ identities are observed. Nevertheless,
we also show in Proposition 3.1 that, for a complete set of bids, either symmetry or
independence restores identification. The surprising result is that anonymity does
not prevent the identification of asymmetric IPV models. Our proof is constructive
as it gives FX(.) as a function of FB(.). The empirical counterpart of this construc-
tion will then be used in the section devoted to nonparametric estimation. The proof
of this result is thus given in the body of the text. The resolution of this inverse
problem contains two steps. First we derive the distribution of the bids B∗i from the
distribution of the order statistics Bp, the vector of the bidding order statistics. It
is the innovative step: by an appropriate reparametrization, the nonlinear inverse
problem we face is reduced to a known one, as it happens the root-finding of well
chosen polynomials. The second step is the identification of bidders’ private signals
from the distribution of B∗ and is well-known: it is straightforward in the second
price auction, whereas the first price auction has been treated by GPV.
Proposition 3.1 Under the full observation of any submitted bids and under anony-
mous bids, in the first price and second price auctions and for n ≥ 2:
• The asymmetric APV model is not identified. For any distribution FX(.) from
the asymmetric APV model, there exists a continuum of local perturbations
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of FX(.) that stay in the asymmetric APV model and that are observationally
equivalent to FX(.), i.e. that lead to the same distribution of bids.
• The symmetric APV model is identified.
• The asymmetric IPV model is identified.
The second point is immediate since the identification result in Li et al. [23] does
not rely on the observability of bidders’ identities. For the first point, we construct,
as it is done in the appendix, a continuum of local perturbations of the primitives
that are observationally equivalent. For any IPV model, the local perturbations
constructed in the proof of the first point of Proposition 3.1 break independence,
which illustrates the more general point that any unordered (i.e. observable up to
a permutation) vector of independent components is observationally equivalent to a
model where the components are correlated. In other words, the econometrician has
to assume independence in order to identify asymmetry.8
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the third point. We observe the
CDFs FBp for any p = 1, · · · , n. As independence implies exchangeability, then we
can identify the CDF F (r:m)B (u), r ≤ m, that corresponds to the rth order statistic
among m bidders that would result by exogenous variation of the number of bidders,
by recursive use of the formula (see Athey and Haile [2] p.2128)
m− r
m
F
(r:m)
B (u) +
r
m
F
(r+1:m)
B (u) = F
(r:m−1)
B (u), ∀u, r,m, r ≤ m− 1,m ≤ n. (3)
The corresponding induction is initialized by noting that F (p:n)B = FBp . In par-
ticular, it implies the identification of the CDFs F (r:r)B for any r ∈ [1, n]. Indeed,
the expression of F (r:r)B corresponds to a linear combination of the CDFs FBp , for
p = 1, · · · , n. Finally, independence allows us to express F (r:r)B (b) as a function of
the vector {FB∗i (b)}i=1,··· ,n for any b in the following way.
8The nonparametric approaches in the literature that test whether the different components
of a vector X = (x1, · · · , xm) ∈ Rm are independent, e.g. the Blum et al. [5] test, consider
that the statistician observes ordered vectors, i.e. she can distinguish X = (x1, · · · , xm) from
X ′ = (xpi(1), · · · , xpi(m)) where pi is a permutation in [1,m]. With respect to our setup, those
tests are requiring nonanonymous data. Independence can not be fully tested under anonymity.
Nevertheless, independence involves some testable restrictions under anonymity: a set of generalized
discriminants has to be nonnegative as established in Proposition 5.1. In the same way as we propose
tests for symmetry in section 5, partial independence tests could be built.
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F
(1:1)
B (b) =
1
n
·
n∑
i1=1
FB∗i1
(b)
F
(2:2)
B (b) =
1
n(n− 1) ·
∑
i1,i2,i1 6=i2
FB∗i1
(b) · FB∗i2 (b)
... ...
F
(r:r)
B (b) =
1
n(n− 1) · · · (n− r + 1) ·
∑
i1,··· ,ir,il 6=il′
∏
ik∈{i1,··· ,ir}
FB∗ik
(b)
... ..
F
(n:n)
B (b) =
1
n!
·
∑
i1,··· ,in,il 6=il′
∏
ik∈{i1,··· ,in}
FB∗ik
(b)
(4)
The right expressions in the system (4) are closely related to the coefficients of
the expansion of the polynomial X →∏ni=1 (X − FB∗i (b)). The coefficient in front of
the monomial Xr for 0 ≤ r ≤ n−1 is given by (−1)n−r ·∑i1<···<ir∏ik∈{i1,·,ir} FB∗ik (b),
which is also equal to (−1)
n−r
r!
·∑i1,··· ,ir,il 6=il′ ∏ik∈{i1,·,ir} FB∗ik (b). From the Fundamental
Theorem of Algebra [4], the factorization of a polynomial according to its roots
among the complex number C exists and is unique. Consequently, when b is fixed,
the probabilities (FB∗i (b))i=1,··· ,n in the above system of equations correspond exactly
to the n roots of the polynomial of degree n:
u→
n∑
i=0
ai(b) · (−1)n−i · ui, (5)
where an(b) = 1 and ai(b) = n(n−1)···(i+1)(n−i)! · F (n−i:n−i)B (b), for i < n. By continuity
of the coefficients of the polynomial as a function of b and since the roots of a
polynomial depends continuously on its coefficients (see Theorem 5.12 in [4]), there
exists a continuous function b→ (P1(b), · · · , Pn(b)) mapping the vector of pointwise
solutions. What remains to show is the more restrictive condition that the true
CDFs FB∗i (b), i = 1, · · · , n, are the unique solution up to a permutation. If the n
roots of the above polynomial were always distinct for any b in the interior of the
bidding support (b, b), then, by continuity of the CDFs FB∗i (.), i = 1, · · · , n, the
only candidate solution would be (FB∗1(.), · · · , FB∗n(.)) = (P1(.), · · · , Pn(.)) (up to a
permutation). On the contrary, if the maps Pi(b) cross then the way we construct
the continuous selection of the roots (P1(.), · · · , Pn(.)) is no more unique as it is
illustrated in Figure 1 where two candidate solutions are depicted for n = 2 when
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the roots cross at least once.
0
bbb1 b
∗ b2b
1 (P1(.), P2(.))
P2(b1)
P1(b1)
P1(b2)
P2(b2)
Figure 1: Identification of the asymmetric IPV model, n = 2
Solution 1
FB∗1 = P1
FB∗2 = P2
Solution 2
FB∗1 = max{P1, P2}
FB∗2 = min{P1, P2}
Legend:
Indeed, the sole knowledge of the CDFs F (p:m)B for any p,m such that p ≤ m ≤ n
can not discriminate between these two possible solutions. Nevertheless, the knowl-
edge of the joint distribution FB of all order statistics selects a unique solution.
For example, consider the case n = 2 and a point b∗ where P1(.) and P2(.) strictly
cross as in Figure 1. We consider a point b2 at the right of the intersection (respec-
tively b1 at the left of the intersection) such that the derivative of the upper root
as a function of b, P ′2(b2) (resp. P ′1(b1)), is strictly bigger (resp. strictly smaller)
than the derivative of the lower root, P ′1(b2) (resp. P ′2(b1)). Such a point exists
in the right (resp. left) neighborhood of b∗ since the intersection is strict. Then
the two candidate solutions lead to different predictions in term of the joint den-
sity of the order statistics: fB(b1, b2) = fB∗1(b1) · fB∗2(b2) + fB∗1(b2) · fB∗2(b1). The
difference of the densities fB(b1, b2) between the two depicted solutions is equal to
(P ′2(b2)−P ′1(b2)) · (P ′2(b1)−P ′1(b1)) 6= 0. The argument remains valid for any number
of bidders and also for more general intersections where the roots may coincide on
an interval.
In the subsequent estimation analysis, we will rule out such uncertainties with
regards to possible intersections by assuming strict stochastic dominance between
bidders’ CDFs. It avoids complications concerning the rate of convergence at the
intersection points. Without any specific assumption, an appropriate way to decide
between the finite number of solutions resulting from the intersections is to choose
the solution that maximizes the empirical likelihood. The probability to choose the
‘good’ candidate converges to 1 as the size of the sample grows.
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4 Nonparametric Estimation
In practice the auctioned objects can be heterogeneous and the number and
the identities of the participants can vary across auctions. Let Zl ∈ Rd denote
the d-dimensional vector of relevant continuous characteristics for the lth auctioned
object and Il (nIl) the set (number) of participants in the lth auction. The vector
(Zl, Il) is assumed to be common knowledge among bidders and is also observed
by the econometrician.9 The set of participants (that may vary from an auction
to another) is denoted by the letter I and covariates by the letter z. Let I be the
(finite) set of possible values for I. Relative to our previous notation, we will now
work with conditional CDFs and PDFs of private values and bids given (Zl, Il). E.g.
FXi|Z,I(.|Zl, Il) denotes the CDF of bidder i’s private value Xil in the lth auction.
Using independence, (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
Xil = B
∗
il + ψi(B
∗
il, Zl, Il), where ψi(., ., .) is defined as (6)
ψi(b, z, I) =

[∑
j∈Il,j 6=i
fB∗
j
|Z,I(B∗il|Zl,Il)
FB∗
j
|Z,I(B∗il|Zl,Il)
]−1
in the first price auction
0 in the second price auction.
In this section, we adapt GPV’s two step estimation procedure to recover the
densities of bidders’ private values.10 Two caveats arise. First we can not directly
estimate with kernel techniques the ratio
FB∗−i|B∗i ,Z,I(.|.,.,.)
fB∗−i|B∗i Z,I(.|.,.,.)
since identities are not ob-
served. Thus we need to convert our estimations of the CDFs and PDFs of Bpl,
that can be done with the standard kernel estimation techniques as in GPV, into
estimations for the CDFs and PDFs of B∗il. Second, if
FB∗−i|B∗i ,Z,I(.|.,.,.)
fB∗−i|B∗i Z,I(.|.,.,.)
is suitably es-
timated, we can apply (6) to define pseudo private values in the first price auction:
each pseudo private value being associated to a possible identity of the bidder. With
anonymity, an additional step is needed: for a given vector of bidding order statistics
9The observation of the identities of the participants by the econometrician may appear in
contradiction with our paradigm of anonymous bids. If we could not observe participants’ identities,
as on eBay, we can adapt our method if we are prepared to make specific assumptions about the
identities of the fluctuating bidders (e.g. real bidder versus shill bidder). Anyway, in an asymmetric
framework, the exogenous participation assumption that is often made for identification as in Athey
and Haile [2] may not be suitable since the expected payoffs in the auction differ across bidders.
Considering endogenous participation with a set of participants that is assumed to be known is an
alternative.
10See Flambard and Perrigne [8] for the the implementation of GPV’s procedure in the asymmetric
IPV model with nonanonymous bids.
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Bl = (B1l, · · · , Bpl, · · · , Bnl), we have to estimate the probability that buyer i’s bid
B∗il is equal to Bpl for any p ∈ [1, n]. Then instead of a unique pseudo private value
for a given bidder, we obtain a weighted vector of n pseudo private values that is
used to estimated nonparametrically buyers’ private values PDFs. We also lead in
parallel the analysis for the second price auction which is not straightforward as it
was with nonanonymous bids and also involves the computation of a vector of pseudo
probabilities.
Denote ΣI the set of the nI! permutations between participants’ identities and
the order statistics of the bids. Such an assignment of the bids to the participants
is denoted pi : I → [1, nI] where pi(i) = p means that the pth order statistic of the
bids corresponds to bidder i, i.e. b∗i = bp. To cover both the case where bidders’
identities remain fully anonymous with the common case where only the identity of
the winner is disclosed, we consider the most general case when the econometrician
may have some information linking some submitted bids with the identities of some
participants. This information is modeled as a partition of ΣI which may depend
both on the vector of bids B and the auction (but not on B∗). Denote by σIl this
information set at the lth auction. If pi is the assignment that match the (observed)
vector of bids Bl to the true (unobserved) realization B∗l , then we know that pi ∈ σIl .
σIl = ΣIl corresponds to the case where bids are fully anonymous, whereas the
opposite case where σIl is always a singleton corresponds to non-anonymous bids.
Our procedure is decomposed in 6 steps, three being already present in GPV.
First step Using the observations {(Bpl, Zl, Il); p ∈ Il, l = 1, · · · , L}, we estimate
the CDFs and the PDFs of the pth ordered statistics of the bids for p ∈ [1, nIl ] and
the PDFs of the covariates. Let x+ denote max{0, x}.
F̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I) = [min
{
1
LhdFBp|Z
L∑
l=1
1(Bpl ≤ b)KFBp|Z
(
z − Zl
hFBp|Z
)
1(Il = I), 1
}
]+ (7)
f̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I) = [
1
LhdfBp|Z
L∑
l=1
KfBp|Z
(
b−Bpl
hfBp|Z
,
z − Zl
hfBp|Z
)
1(Il = I)]
+ (8)
f̂Z,I(z, I) = [
1
LhdfZ
L∑
l=1
n∑
p=1
KfZ(
z − Zl
hfZ
) · 1(Il = I)]+. (9)
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Here hFBp|Z , hfBp|Z , hfZ are some bandwidths, andKFBp|Z(.),KfBp|Z(., .) andKfZ(.)
are kernels with bounded supports.
Second step By recursive use of the empirical counterpart of the formula (3),
we estimate F̂ (r:r)B,Z,I(b, z, I) and f̂
(r:r)
B,Z,I(b, z, I) for r = 1, · · · , n, which respectively
corresponds (up to a known multiplicative coefficient) to the coefficients and their
derivatives with respect to the variable b of a polynomial whose vector of roots is the
vector of bidders’ bidding distribution {FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)}i∈I .
For r ≤ m ≤ n, we define F̂ (r:m)B,Z,I(b, z, I) and f̂ (r:m)B,Z,I(b, z, I) by recursive use of the
formulas: ∀b, z, r ≤ m− 1
m− r
m
F̂
(r:m)
B,Z,I(b, z, I) +
r
m
F̂
(r+1:m)
B,Z,I (b, z, I) = F̂
(r:m−1)
B,Z,I (b, z, I)
m− r
m
f̂
(r:m)
B,Z,I(b, z, I) +
r
m
f̂
(r+1:m)
B,Z,I (b, z, I) = f̂
(r:m−1)
B,Z,I (b, z, I).
(10)
As a weighted sum of the estimators F̂Bp,Z,I which are confined in the interval
[0, 1], the estimators F̂ (r:m)B,Z,I(b, z, I) are confined in the interval [0, 1].
Third step LetΥ : [0, 1]n → Cn be the function such that (ω1, · · · , ωn) = Υ(an−1, · · · , a0)
(where ω1 ≥ · · · ≥ ωn according to the lexicographic order in C) is the ordered vector
of the roots (possibly complex number) counted with their order of multiplicity of the
polynomial Q(u) = un +
∑n−1
i=0 ai · (−1)n−iui, i.e. Q(u) =
∏n
i=1 (u− ωi). Theorem
5.12 in [4] show that Υ is continuous and hence uniformly continuous on the compact
[0, 1]n. Then, after an immediate generalization of (4) and (5) to our environment
with covariates, it would be natural to estimate the CDFs F̂B∗i ,Z,I(., .), i ∈ I by
(F̂B∗j1 ,Z,I
(b, z, I), · · · , F̂B∗jnI ,Z,I(b, z, I)) = R[Υ(ân−1(b, z, I), · · · , â0(b, z, I))], (11)
where âi(b, z, I) = n(n−1)···(i+1)(n−i)! · F̂ (n−i:n−i)B,Z,I (b, z, I) · (f̂Z,I(z, I))n−i−1, R[z] denotes
the real part of the complex vector z and I = (j1, · · · , jnI ), where j1 < · · · < jnI .
The rest of this step is devoted to the estimation of fB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) for i ∈ I. The
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derivative of the polynomial relation with respect to b leads to:
∂Q(u)
∂b
=
nI−1∑
i=0
∂ai
∂b
(b, z, I) · (−1)n−i · ui
= −
∑
i∈I
∏
j∈I, j 6=i
(
u− FB∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)
)
· fB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I),∀u, b, z, I,
where ∂ai
∂b
(b, z, I) = n(n−1)···(i+1)
(n−i)! · f (n−i:n−i)B,Z,I (b, z, I) · (fZ,I(z, I))n−i−1. For a single
estimated root, i.e. for i such that F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) 6= F̂B∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I) for any j 6= i, we
have a natural estimator for the corresponding density:
f̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) =
∑nI−1
s=0
∂bak
∂b (b, z, I) · (−1)nI−s+1 ·
[
F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)
]s
∏
j∈I, j 6=i
(
F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)− F̂B∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)
) , (12)
where ∂bas
∂b
(b, z, I) = n(n−1)···(s+1)
(n−s)! · f̂ (n−s:n−s)B,Z,I (b, z, I) · (f̂Z,I(z, I))n−s−1. Consider
now the case of a multiple estimated root of multiplicity k > 1, i.e. consider J =
{jm, · · · , jm+k−1} such that for any i ∈ J , F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) = F̂B∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I) if and only
if j ∈ J . The derivative of the polynomial relation with respect to b and k− 1 times
with respect to u leads to:
∂Q(u)
∂b(∂u)k−1
=
nI−k∑
i=0
∂ai+k−1
∂b
(b, z, I) · (−1)n−i−k+1 · i+ k − 1!
i!
· ui
= −
∑
i∈I
∂
∏
j∈I, j 6=i
(
u− FB∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)
)
(∂u)k−1
· fB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I),∀u, b, z, I.
For i ∈ J , the expression ∂∏j∈I, j 6=i (u− FB∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I))/(∂u)k−1 evaluated at
u = FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) reduces to
∏
j∈I, j /∈J
(
FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)− FB∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)
)
. Finally, we
have a natural estimator for the corresponding density:
f̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) =
∑nI−k
s=0
∂bas+k−1
∂b (b, z, I) · (−1)n−s−k+1 · s+k−1!s! ·
[
F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)
]s
∏
j∈I, j /∈J
(
F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)− F̂B∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)
) .
For k = 1, this formula corresponds exactly to (12). Now we have all the elements
to estimate the function ψi(., ., .) in the first price auction. In the second price
auction the job seems to be done since we have recovered the bid distributions which
corresponds to the valuation distributions. However, we still have not used the
additional information σIl which motivates the three remaining steps where we build
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a pseudo sample of private values and where a probability is estimated to each private
value for each possible identity. Those probabilities are updated according to the
Bayesian rule with regards to the additional information σIl . For the first price
auction, those remaining steps are also generalizing the second step in GPV.
Fourth step In view of (6) and similarly to GPV, it would be natural to construct
pseudo private values for each order statistic p = 1, · · · , nIl and for each potential
bidder i ∈ Il: X˜ipl = B∗pl + ψ˜i(B∗pl, Zl, Il). Unfortunately, as has been emphasized by
GPV, the estimator of ψi(., ., .) in the first price auction is asymptotically biased at
the boundaries of the support and trimming is required. The same trimming is also
needed in the second price auction.
In this aim we first estimate the boundary of the support of the joint distribution
of (B,Z, I), which is unknown. Since the support of (Z, I) can be assumed to be
known, we focus on the estimation of the support [b(z, I), b(z, I)] of the conditional
distribution of B given (Z, I). On the one hand, we assume that b(z, I) does not
depend on (z, I) and is estimated by the minimum of all submitted bids. On the
other hand, b(z, I) should be estimated as in GPV. Let hδ > 0. We consider the
following partition of Rd with a generic hypercube of side hδ: ϑk1,··· ,kd = [k1hδ , (k1+1)hδ)×
· · · × [kdhδ , (kd + 1)hδ), where k1, · · · , kd runs over Zd. This induces a partition of [z, z].
Given a set of participants I and a value z, the estimate of the upper boundary
b(z, I) is the maximum of those bids for which Il = I and the corresponding value of
Zl falls in the hypercube ϑk1,··· ,kd(z) containing z. Formally, our estimators for the
upper and lower boundaries are respectively given by b̂ = inf {B1l, l = 1, · · · , L} and
b̂(z, I) = sup {BnI l, l = 1, · · · , L;Zl ∈ ϑk1,··· ,kd(z), Il = I}. Our estimator for S(FBp,Z,I)
is Ŝ(FBp,Z,I) = {(b, z, I) : b ∈ [̂b, b̂(z, I)], z ∈ [z, z], I ∈ I}.
We now turn to the trimming. It is well known that kernel estimators are
asymptotically biased at the boundaries of the support. Following GPV, we have
to trim out observations that are close to the boundaries of the support. Because
b ≤ b̂ ≤ b̂(z, I) ≤ b, f̂Bp,Z,I(., ., .) and thus f̂B∗j ,Z,I(., ., .) are asymptotically unbiased
on [̂b+
ρfBp|Z ·hfBp|Z
2
, b̂(z, I)− ρfBp|Z ·hfBp|Z
2
]. This leads to defining the sample of pseudo
private values {X̂ipl, i ∈ Il; p = 1, · · · , nIl ; l = 1, · · · , L} where X̂ipl, the estimate of
the private value of bidder i would it be the bidder of the pth order statistic of the
vector of bids Bl, is defined by
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X̂ipl =
Bpl + ψ̂i(B
∗
il, Zl, Il) if b̂+ hfBp|Z ≤ Bpl ≤ b̂(Zl, Il)
+∞ otherwise
, (13)
where ψ̂i(b, z, I) equals respectively
[∑
j 6=i
bfB∗
j
,Z,I(b,z,I)bFB∗
j
,Z,I(b,z,I)
]−1
and 0 in the first and sec-
ond price auctions.
Fifth step Contrary to GPV, we should not use directly this pseudo sample of
private values in a standard kernel estimation to estimate fXi,Z,I(x, z, I). Each pseudo
values should not be weighted in the same way since for a given order statistic Bp the
probability that it results from a given bidder i depends on the identity of this bidder.
Thus we have to estimate the corresponding probability weights. Under anonymity,
there are at most nIl ! vectors of private values that can rationalize a given vector of
bids (B1l, · · · , BnI l). Denote by pi ∈ ΣI the true permutation that matches a given
vector of bidding order statistics (B1l, · · · , BnI l) with the unobserved vector of bids
(B∗1l, · · · , B∗nl). The following expression gives the theoretical probability, denoted
by Prob(pi = pi|(b1, · · · , bnI , z, I)), that the assignment of bidders to the observed
order statistics corresponds to a permutation pi:
Prob(pi = pi|(b1, · · · , bnI , z, I)) =
∏
i∈I fB∗i ,Z,I(bpi(i), z, I)∑
pi′∈σI
∏
i∈I fB∗i ,Z,I(bpi′(i), z, I)
· 1{pi ∈ σI}. (14)
Note that we use the information set σI to refine our beliefs on pi. Then the
probability, denoted by Pip, that the pth order statistic results from bidder i equals
to the sum of the above probabilities for all the permutations that assign i to the pth
order statistic, i.e. Pip =
∑
pi∈ΣI s.t. pi(i)=p Prob(pi = pi|(b1, · · · , bn, z, I)). Its empirical
counterpart P̂ipl is given straightforwardly by means of our previous estimators:
P̂ipl =
∑
pi∈ΣIl s.t. pi(i)=p
∏
i∈Il f̂B∗i ,Z,I(Bpi(i)l, Zl, Il)∑
pi′∈σIl
∏
i∈Il f̂B∗i ,Z,I(Bpi′(i)l, Zl, Il)
· 1{pi ∈ σIl}. (15)
Sixth step Finally, we use the pseudo sample {(X̂ipl, P̂ipl, Zl), i ∈ Il, p = 1, · · · , nIl , l =
1, · · · , L} to estimate nonparametrically the densities fXi|Z,I(x|z, I) by f̂Xi|Z,I(x|z, I) =
f̂Xi|Z,I(x, z, I)/f̂Z,I(z, I), where
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f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) =
1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
L∑
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl
P̂ipl ·KfXi,Z(
x− X̂ipl
hfXi,Z
,
z − Zl
hfXi,Z
) · 1(Il = I). (16)
Here hfXi,Z are bandwidths and KfXi,Z(., .) are kernels with bounded support.
Summary of the differences with GPV The first step in GPV’s approach con-
sists in estimating the maps ψi(., ., .) which requires the estimation of fB∗j ,Z,I(Bpl, Zl, I)
and FB∗j ,Z,I(Bpl, Zl, I). Instead of being directly estimated in a similar way as in
our first step, anonymity requires two additional steps: the second step is a linear
reparametrization for which we has thus no reason to be worried about, the third
step is a nonlinear reparametrization which is ill-conditioned at the limit where some
bidders are symmetric. The fourth step consists as in GPV in the construction of
the set of pseudo private values: nIl pseudo private values are associated to each bid,
one for each possible identities of the potential bidders. On the contrary, in GPV, a
unique pseudo private value has to be computed for each bid, the one corresponding
to the identity of the bidder which is not anonymous. The fifth step is the most
interesting step of our estimation procedure and is not linked to the ideas of the
identification section: for each bid, we compute the probability that it comes from a
given bidder. Finally, as in GPV, the last step computes the CDFs and PDFs from
the pseudo sample which does not suffer from anonymity anymore since it includes a
consistent estimator of the (unobserved) realized identities. The asymptotic proper-
ties as L → ∞ of such a multi-step nonparametric estimator are rigorously derived
in section 6. To end this section, we briefly discuss the new error terms resulting
from anonymity. We decompose the difference f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) − fXi,Z,I(x|z, I) into
three terms.
f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I)− fXi,Z,I(x, z, I) = ε1 + ε2 + ε3, where (17)
ε1 = 1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
∑L
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl (P̂ipl − Pipl) ·KfXi,Z(
x−Xipl
hfXi,Z
, z−ZlhfXi,Z
) · 1(Il = I)
ε2 = 1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
∑L
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl P̂ipl ·
(
KfXi,Z(
x− bXipl
hfXi,Z
, z−ZlhfXi,Z
)−KfXi,Z(
x−Xipl
hfXi,Z
, z−ZlhfXi,Z
)
)
1(Il = I)
ε3 = f˜Xi,Z,I(x, z, I)− fXi,Z,I(x, z, I)
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and where f˜Xi,Z,I is the (infeasible) nonparametric estimator of the density of
(Xi, Z, I) using the unobserved values Xipl and the unobserved probabilities Pipl:
f˜Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) =
1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
L∑
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl
Pipl ·KfXi,Z(
x−Xipl
hfXi,Z
,
z − Zl
hfXi,Z
) · 1(Il = I). (18)
The third term ε3 is standard and corresponds to the usual sampling error if
private values were directly observed. When bidders’ private value density functions
fXi,Z,I(., ., I) have R bounded continuous derivatives, the optimal uniform conver-
gence rate for estimating fXi,Z,I(., ., I) is (
L
logL
)R/(2R+d+1) (see Stone [37]). The sec-
ond term ε2 is the one pointed in GPV in a framework with non-anonymous data:
it comes from the discrepancy between the realized (unobserved) private values and
the estimated pseudo private values that are estimated from the observed bids and
an estimation of the equilibrium equations (1) and (2) for respectively the second
first price auctions. In the second price auction, due to the triviality of the strategic
interaction, this discrepancy is null and the optimal uniform rate of convergence for
estimating private values’ densities is thus (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+1) under non-anonymous
data. On the contrary, this discrepancy matters in the first-price auction and con-
sequently the above convergence rate can not be attained in GPV but only the rate
( L
logL
)R/(2R+d+3). The choice of the bandwidth hfXi,Z is driven by the trade-off be-
tween controlling those two errors terms, the optimal bandwidth being such that
the two rates are equal. The optimal estimator involves a larger bandwidth than
if bidders’ private values were directly observed, i.e. it oversmoothes the pseudo
private values in order to average the errors in the estimation of this pseudo sample.
Anonymity introduces new caveats that occur in the second, third and fifth steps of
our estimation procedure. The second and third steps are making harder the estima-
tion of the pseudo private values. Nevertheless according to the rate of convergence
asymptotic criterium, those steps are innocuous since the same rate in any inner
closed subset of the bidding support is obtained for the pseudo private values. The
fifth step introduces the new error term ε1 that results from the discrepancy between
the true and the estimated probabilities of the different assignments between bids
and bidders. We show that the convergence rate of ε1 does not introduce a new force
in the above trade-off in the first price auction. By choosing appropriately the rate
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Auction format: Second-price First-price
Standard term: ε3 ( logLL )
R/(2R+d+1) ( logLL )
R/(2R+d+3)
GPV’s term: ε2 0 ( logLL )
R/(2R+d+3)
Anonymity term: ε1 ( logLL )
R/(2R+d+1) ( logLL )
(R+1)/(2R+d+3)
Table 1: Decomposition of the error term of the estimator of the density of bidders’ private value and their
respective rate of convergence in our ‘optimal’ procedure.
of the bandwidths, this new error term can be maintained such that its convergence
rate is strictly bigger than the rates for two other error terms. This discussion is
summarized in Table 1.
5 Nonparametric Tests for symmetry
Our procedure to test for symmetry is the same for both the first and second price
auctions. We present it with a general structure of covariates as in the previous
section but for a fix set of n participants since an important by-product of our
analysis is how the power of our test varies with the structure of the data. For
example, with two kinds of bidders (Strong versus Weak) distributed according to
two given distributions FS and FW , we are interested to know whether it is easier to
reject symmetry depending not solely on some measure of the degree of asymmetry
(e.g. related to the differences FB∗i ,Z(., .) − FB∗j ,Z(., .)) but also on the number of
participants and the structure of the asymmetry (e.g. a single strong bidder or as
many strong bidders as weak bidders).
5.1 A General Testing Principle
This subsection derives a complete discrimination system to characterize the
structure of the roots of polynomials with real roots, i.e. polynomials P such that
P (X) =
∏n
i=1 (X − xi) where the roots xi are real numbers. We first define what we
call a root structure. Second we introduce the determinant of well chosen matrix.
Definition 2 A polynomial with real roots P (X) of degree n has the root struc-
ture (k1, · · · , kr(P )) where
∑r(P )
i=1 ki = n and k1 ≥ · · · ≥ kr(P ) ≥ 1 if P (X) =∏r(P )
i=1 (X − xi)ki for some {xi}i=1,··· ,r(P ) such that xi 6= xj for all i, j. The integer
r(P ) is the number of distinct roots.
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Definition 3 The Discrimination matrix of the monic polynomial P = Xp +∑p−1
i=0 ai.X
i is the (2p+ 1)× (2p+ 1) matrix:
Discr(P ) =
26666666666666666664
1 ap−1 ap−2 · · · a0
0 p (p− 1)ap−1 · · · a1
1 ap−1 · · · a1 a0
0 p · · · 2.a2 a1
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
1 ap−1 · · · a0
0 p · · · a1
1 ap−1 · · · a0
37777777777777777775
.
For k ∈ [1, n], let ∆(P, k) denote the determinant of the submatrix formed by the
first 2k rows and the first 2k columns of Discr(P ). The numbers ∆(P, k) are also
called generalized discriminants. Denote by P (i) the ith derivative of the polynomial
P (with P (0) = P ). Note that the generalized discriminants∆(P (i), k) are polynomial
functions of the coefficients of the primitive polynomial P .
Proposition 5.1 (Corollary of Theorem 2.1 in Yang [41]) A polynomial with
real roots P has the root structure (k1, · · · , kr(P )) if and only if, for any i ∈ [0, n−2],
{ ∆(P (i), k) > 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ ρ(i)
∆(P (i), k) = 0 for ρ(i) < k ≤ n− i
, (19)
where ρ(i) = n− i−∑r(P )j=1 (kj − i− 1)+.
The number ρ(i) corresponds to the number of distinct roots of the polynomials
P (i). Proposition 5.1 provides a complete discrimination system: the generalized
discriminants are all positive since the underlying polynomials have only real roots
while some are null due to the multiplicity of some roots.11
Coming back to our framework, the probabilities (FB∗i ,Z(b, z))i=1,··· ,n are corre-
sponding exactly to the n roots of the polynomial P(b,z) : u→
∑n
i=0 ai(b, z) · (−1)n−i · ui,
where an(b, z) = 1 and ai(b, z) = n(n−1)···(i+1)(n−i)! · F (n−i:n−i)B,Z (b, z) · (fZ(z))n−i−1 for
i < n. For a given bid b and a given set of covariates z, the root structure is
characterized by the generalized discriminants ∆(P (i)b,z , k), which can be easily es-
timated by their sample analogs ∆̂(P (i)b,z , k) = ∆(P̂
(i)
b,z , k) where P̂b,z is the sam-
11Note that some constraints in the discrimination system may be redundant since the possible
vectors for (ρ(0), · · · , ρ(n − 1)) do not cover the full spectrum [1, n] × [1, n − 1] × · · · × [1, 2], e.g.
ρ(i+ 1) ≥ ρ(i)− 1.
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ple analog of the polynomial Pb,z, i.e. with ai(b, z) being replaced (for i < n) by
âi(b, z) =
n(n−1)···(i+1)
(n−i)! · F̂ (n−i:n−i)B,Z (b, z) · (f̂Z(z))n−i−1. Then various testing statistics
can be build to test for some underlying root structure. Popular examples are:
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type tests based on suprema, i.e. on Supb,z∆̂(P (i)b,z , k).
• Tests based on means, i.e. on weighted expectations of ∆̂(P (i)b,z , k).
As shown in Proposition 5.1, such tests would in general rely on multiple nonlinear
inequality constraints which would lead to testing statistics that are asymptotically
distributed as a weighted sum of chi-squared distributions.12 The related weights
depend on the local nature of the inequality constraints as emphasized by Wolak
[40]. The noise associated to the estimation of those weights adds some nuisance for
inference. From a theoretical perspective, multiple constraints make the derivation
of explicit formulas for the asymptotic distribution difficult. For those reasons and
also because it is one of the most fundamental test for symmetry, we consider below
how to test for full symmetry against the alternative of some asymmetry. In this
case, the discrimination system reduces to a single equation as stated in the following
corollary and can thus be easily tested with standard one-sided tests.
Corollary 5.2 A polynomial with real roots P of degree n has the root structure (n)
if and only if ∆(P, 2) = 0. If P has some distinct roots, then ∆(P, 2) > 0.
Furthermore, we develop a test based on means. Monte Carlo simulations avail-
able upon request have shown that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type test based on the
statistic Supb,z∆̂(Pb,z, 2) has less power to reject the null.
5.2 A Test based on Means
We develop a test of full symmetry, i.e. FB∗1,Z(., .) = · · · = FB∗n,Z(., .) against some
asymmetry, i.e. FB∗i ,Z(b, z) 6= FB∗j ,Z(b, z), for some i and j on a positive measure of b
and z. The discriminant∆(Pb,z, 2) is equal to n2(n−1)
(
(F (1:1)B,Z (b, z))
2 − F (2:2)B,Z (b, z) · fZ(z)
)
.
From corollary 5.2, our testing hypothesis can be written as:
H0 (full symmetry) : H = 0
H1 (some asymmetry) : H > 0
,
12See Silvapulle and Sen’s comprehensive book [35] on constrained statistical inference. Standard
theory applies here since the constraints in the discrimination system (19) are Chernoff-regular.
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where H = ∫ ∫ ((F (1:1)B,Z (b, z))2 − F (2:2)B,Z (b, z) · fZ(z)) dF (1:1)B,Z (b, z). The sample
analog of H is given by:
Ĥ = 1
Ln
L∑
l=1
n∑
p=1
(
[F̂
(1:1)
B,Z (Bpl, Zl)]
2 − F̂ (2:2)B,Z (Bpl, Zl)f̂Z(Zl)
)
, (20)
where f̂Z, F̂
(1:1)
B,Z and F̂
(2:2)
B,Z are defined according to the first and second step of
our estimation procedure, i.e. from equations (7-10). Next proposition establishes
the consistency and asymptotic normality of Ĥ.
Proposition 5.3 Suppose that KFBp|Z and KfZ are kernels and hFBp|Z and hfZ con-
verges to zero as L→∞.
√
L.
(
Ĥ − H
)
→d N (0,Σ).
Under H0, we have Σ2 = EZt [[f(Zt)]4]/(45n(n − 1)). Without covariates, the
expression of Σ2 is reduced to 1
45n(n−1) .
Define the test statistic: t =
√
L. bH√cΣ2 , where Σ̂2 = 145n(n−1) · 1L
∑L
l=1 [f̂(Zl)]
4 is the
sample analog of Σ2. Σ̂2 is a consistent estimate of Σ2 converging at the rate
√
L with
some covariates. Without covariates, Σ2 is known. Symmetry can not be rejected at
the level α if and only if the test statistic t is smaller than q1−α, the (1−α) quantile
of the normal distribution. Without covariates, the distribution of the test statistic
is not only asymptotically distribution free but fully distribution free under H0 as it
can be checked directly from its general expression and tests should better rely on
the simulated quantiles of the test statistic than on their asymptotic approximations.
However, the asymptotic approximation -provided that its accuracy is satisfactory-
can be useful for the following exercise: for a given form of asymmetry and for a
given level α, we are interested in finding the necessary size of the data to reach a
given power of rejection. Asymptotic approximations seem very accurate for small
data set as reported in Table 2 for L = 40 and L = 200 and different values of n.
Under the alternative H1, we have no tractable asymptotic approximation for the
standard deviation of the test statistic. However, the median of the test statistic
coincides asymptotically with the mean which is known. Finally, we obtain the
following corollary about the way to reach the power 50%.13
13Unreported simulations show that the variance Σ2 under H0 is a good approximation of the
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Corollary 5.4 Asymptotically, our test reject symmetry with a probability greater
than one half if and only if the variable H is greater than q1−αΣ√
L
.
Equivalently, it says that for a given degree of asymmetry H > 0, the necessary
size L∗ of the data to reject symmetry at the level α with probability at least one
half is approximately
(
q1−αΣ
H
)2
. Without covariates, the expression simplifies to:14
L∗ = q21−α ·
4(n− 1)
45n
·
[
1
n2
.
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
E[
(
FB∗i (b)− FB∗j (b)
)2
]
]−2
,
where the expectation is for b distributed according to the CDF
∑n
i=1 FB∗j (.)/n.
This expression gives some insights on how the structure of the data affect the power
of our test. First, if the number of bidders is duplicated while maintaining the
same asymmetry structure which is reflected by the term is bracket, then L∗ is
proportional to (n−1)/n and thus increasing in n: expanding the number of bidders
per auction makes the detection of asymmetry more difficult. Two effects are at
work. On the one hand, expanding the number bidders per auction expands the
data which is beneficial for the accuracy of estimation under nonanonymous data.
On the other hand, under anonymous data, more bidders per auction weakens the
link between a bid and the identity of the bidder. On the whole, we have shown
that it is the second effect that dominates while both effects are canceling each other
asymptotically when n is large. Second, the term in bracket shows that asymmetry
is easier to detect among ‘balanced’ panels of bidders. Consider some asymmetry
involving two kinds of bidders (Strong and Weak) with the respective CDFs FS and
FW . Let k ∈ [1, n − 1] be the number of Strong bidders. Then the term in bracket
is equal to 2k(n−k)
n2
.
“
E[(FS(b)− FW (b))2]
”−2. As a function of k, this term is symmetric
with respect to k = n/2: it is decreasing from 1 to n/2 and then increasing. The
‘balanced’ panel with k = [n/2] is the best one to reject symmetry.
Numerical application To emphasize that our test has some practical relevance
we compute L∗ for CDFs that have been estimated nonparametrically by Flambard
and Perrigne [8] from auction data for snow removal contracts in Montréal.15 We
ones under H1, which suggests a ‘practical’ approximation for similar computations for any power.
14Another expression for H is 12n2(n−1)
∫ ∫ ∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1
(
FB∗i (b)− FB∗j (b)
)2
d
(
1
n .
∑n
k=1 FB∗k(b)
)
15Flambard and Perrigne generously provided us with those CDFs for the median covariate. The
asymmetry involves two kinds of bidders according to the location of the contract and the location
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L = 40 L = 200
n 2 4 6 2 4 6
share of p-values < 10% 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
share of p-values < 5% 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Table 2: Performance of the asymptotic version of the test based on the Means. 5000 replications for the simulated
statistics.
obtain L∗ = 190 (L∗ = 115) for the 5% level (10% level). Those figures do not
vary much when we slightly perturbate the structure of the bidders. For 8 [resp. 4]
bidders while 4 [resp. 2] being Strong bidders, we obtain L∗ = 199 and L∗ = 120 [
L∗ = 171 and L∗ = 104] for the 5% and 10% levels.
Contrary to our estimation procedure, our testing procedure does not use addi-
tional information on the identity of the bidders. Indeed, a natural procedure (left
for further research) would be to implement some standard test for symmetry on the
pseudo sample of bids and probabilities which would then use any supplementary
information on bidders’ identities. Several reasons have motivated our approach.
First, the computation of the pseudo-probabilities involve the computation of the
bidding densities whereas our approach uses only CDFs of the bidding distributions.
Second, the tractability of the asymptotic variance under the null. Finally, without
covariates, our approach is distribution free. However, the use of such additional
information might be very useful in practice especially if the power is an issue.
6 Asymptotic Properties
6.1 Regularity Assumptions and Key Properties
The next assumptions concern the underlying generating process as well as the
smoothness of the latent joint distribution of (Xil, Zl, Il) for any i ∈ Il.
Assumption A 2 (i) The (d + 1)-dimensional vectors (Zl, Il), l = 1, 2, · · · , are
independently and identically distributed as FZ,I(., .) with density fZ,I(., .).
of the firm in the city. They found evidence for asymmetry between West Firms and Non West
Firms for the Western contracts (as depicted in their Figure 2). In their data with L = 29, the
structure of the bidders contains some variation from one auction to another. We simplify the
structure for the computation doing as if all auctions have 6 bidders while 3 being Strong bidders
and considering no variation in the covariates.
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(ii) For each l the variables Xil, i ∈ Il are independently distributed conditionally
upon (Zl, Il) as FXi|Z,I(.|., .) with density fXi|Z,I(.|., .), for i ∈ Il.
As in Campo et al. [6], we consider here that the support of buyers’ private
values does not depend on the (Z, I) to simplify the presentation, while the general
case can be fully treated as in GPV. It implies that the lower bound of the support
of buyers’ bids does not depend on the variables I and Z. Throughout we denote by
S(∗) and So(∗) the support of ∗ and its interior, respectively.
Assumption A 3 For each bidder i ∈ I ⊂ I,
(i) S(FXi,Z,I) = {(x, z, I) : z ∈ [z, z], x ∈ [x, x], I ⊂ I}; with z < z;
(ii) for (x, z, I) ∈ S(FXi,Z,I), fXi|Z,I(x|z, I) ≥ cf > 0, and for (z, I) ∈ S(FZ,I),
fZ,I(z, I) ≥ cf > 0;
(iii) for each I ⊂ I, FXi|Z,I(.|., I) and fZ,I(., I) admit up to R+1 continuous bounded
partial derivatives on S(FXi,Z,I) and S(FZ,I), with R ≥ 1.
The next assumption is not necessary for identification as established in Propo-
sition 3.1 without heterogeneity across objects. Nevertheless, heterogeneity requires
an additional structure to identify the model. Similar intersections as the one in
Figure 1 when b varies may arise when the variable capturing heterogeneity Z varies.
But the different solutions are observationally equivalent without some mild addi-
tional assumptions. Here to preserve identification, we make the assumption that
bidding distributions can be ordered according to first order stochastic dominance.16
Moreover, to simplify our estimation procedure, we also assume that the dominance
is strict in the interior of the bidding support.17
Assumption A 4 (Strict Stochastic Dominance) The bid densities FB∗i |Z,I(.|z, I)
can be strictly ordered according to first order stochastic dominance: FB∗i |Z,I(b|z, I) >
FB∗j |Z,I(b|z, I) if b ∈ S0(fB∗i |Z,I) for any i, j ∈ I with j > i and any z,I.
16Alternative identification strategies could be to make assumptions on the comparative statics
of the bidding distribution according to Z or use the point that, generically, at an intersection, only
one candidate solution is differentiable at this point.
17Assumption 4 is not on the primitives of the model in the first price auction. With two classes
of bidders, Maskin and Riley [25] show that ‘conditional stochastic dominance’ of private values’
distributions is a sufficient condition for first order stochastic dominance of bids’ distribution.
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A crucial step in deriving uniform rates of convergence in some inverse problem is
to study the smoothness of the observables that is implied by the smoothness of the
latent distributions of the primitives of the model. Here, relative to GPV, we do not
observe the vector of bids B∗ but only the vector of bidding order statistic B. Thus
we are interested in the smoothness of the densities fBp|Z,I(.|., I) for p = 1, · · · , nI .
This is the purpose of the next proposition. It is the analog of proposition 1 in GPV
which derives similar results for the bid densities fB∗i |Z,I(.|., .).
Proposition 6.1 Given A3, the conditional distribution FBp|Z,I(.|., I), p = 1, · · · , nI
and I ⊂ I, satisfies for both the first and second price auctions (if not specified):
(i) its support S(FBp|Z,I) is such that S(FBp|Z,I) = {(b, z, I) : z ∈ [z, z], b ∈
[b(z, I, p), b(z, I, p)], I ⊂ I} with b(z, I, p) > b(z, I, p) for any I, p. Moreover,
(b(., I, p), b(., I, p)) admit up to R + 1 continuous bounded derivatives on [z, z]
for each I ⊂ I and p = 1, · · · , nI . We have b(z, I, p) = x. In the second price
auction, b(z, I, p) = x. In the first price auction b(z, I, nI) = b(z, I, nI − 1).
(ii) for (b, z, I) ∈ C(Bn), fBp|Z,I(b, z, I) ≥ cBp|Z,I > 0, where C(Bn) is a closed
subset of S0(FBn|Z,I);
(iii) for each (I, p), p = 1, · · · , nI , FBp|Z,I(.|., I) admits up to R + 1 continuous
bounded partial derivatives on S(FBp|Z,I) \ ({b(z, I, p)}p=1,··· ,nI−1);
(iv) in the first price auction, for each (I, p), p = 1, · · · , nI , if C(Bp) is a closed
subset of So(FBp|Z,I)\({b(z, I, p)}p=1,··· ,nI ), then fBp|Z,I(.|., I) admits up to R+1
continuous bounded partial derivatives on C(Bp);
(v) in the second price auction, for each (I, p), p = 1, · · · , nI , fBp|Z,I(.|., I) admits
up to R continuous bounded partial derivatives on S(FBp|Z,I)\({b(z, I, p)}p=1,··· ,nI−1).
Note that by comparing (iv) and (v), the bid densities in the first price auction
are smoother than for the second price auction. Thus fBp|Z,I(.|., I) can be estimated
uniformly at a faster rate, namely (L/ logL)(R+1)/(2R+d+3), in the first price than
in the second price auction, namely (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+1). In particular, the optimal
bandwidths -that we specify later in assumption A6- are asymptotically smaller for
the second price auction than for the first price auction. Nevertheless the optimal
uniform convergence rate will be smaller in the first price auction than in the second
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price auction. This is due to the more indirect nature of the link between observables
and latent distributions in the first price auction, see equation (6).
Proposition 6.1 differs from the one appearing in GPV as irregularities of the
CDFs of the order statistic may appear in the interior of their support, more precisely
we may have b(z, I, p) < b(z, I, n) for p ≤ nI − 2. In the following, to alleviate
notation, we make the simplifying assumption A5 that the bidding supports of all
bidders coincide, i.e. b(z, I, p) does not depend on p. Our uniform consistency results
extend provided that the neighborhoods of the bidders’ signals than make them bid
b(z, I, p) are removed. In the same way as the support of bidders’ private values is
consistently estimated in GPV and that the neighborhoods of the lower and upper
bounds of the support are removed with an suitable trimming, we can trim those
inner neighborhoods.
Assumption A 5 (Common bidding support) All bidders have the same bid-
ding support: b(z, I, p) does not depend on p.
6.2 Uniform Consistency
Our main result establishes the uniform consistency of our multistage kernel-
based estimators for the first and second price auctions and with their rates of con-
vergence. As a preliminary step, we first set our choice of kernels and bandwidths
and then establish in proposition 6.2 the uniform consistency with their rates of con-
vergence of our nonparametric estimators of the upper and lower boundaries b(z, I)
and b and also the rates at which the pseudo private values X̂ipl and the pseudo
probabilities P̂ipl converge uniformly to their true values. This proposition is the
analog of propositions 2 and 3 in GPV.
Assumption A 6 • KERNELS
(i) The kernels KFBp|Z(.), KfBp|Z(., .), KfXi,Z(., .) and KfZ(.) are symmet-
ric with bounded hypercube supports of length equal to 2 and continuous
bounded first derivatives with respect to their continuous argument.
(ii)
∫
KfZ(z)dz = 1,
∫
KFBp|Z(z)dz = 1,
∫
KfBp|Z(b, z)dbdz = 1, for any
p = 1, · · · , n and ∫ KfXi,Z(x, z)dxdz = 1 for any i = 1, · · · , n.
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(iii) KFBp|Z(.), KfBp|Z(., .), KfXi,Z(., .) and KfZ(.) are of order R+ 1, R+ 1,R
and R + 1 respectively, i.e. moments of order strictly smaller than the
given order vanish.
• BANDWIDTHS
(i) In the first price auction, the bandwidths hFBp|Z , hfBp|Z, for p = 1, · · · , n,
hfXi,Z for i = 1, · · · , n and hfZ are of the form:
hFBp|Z = λFBp|Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+2) , hfBp|Z = λfBp|Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+3) ,
hfXi,Z = λfXi,Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+3) , hfZ = λfZ(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+2) ,
where the λ’s are strictly positive constants.
(ii) In the second price auction, the bandwidths hFBp|Z , hfBp|Z, for p = 1, · · · , n,
hfXi,Z for i = 1, · · · , n and hfZ are of the form:
hFBp|Z = λFBp|Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d) , hfBp|Z = λfBp|Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+1) ,
hfXi,Z = λfXi,Z(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+1) , hfZ = λfZ(
logL
L
)
1
(2R+d+2) ,
(iii) The “boundary” bandwidth is of the form hδ = λδ( logLL )
1
d+1 if d > 0 where
the λ’s are strictly positive constants.
As in GPV and for both formats, hFBp|Z , hfBp|Z and hfZ are corresponding to the
standard optimal bandwidths such that the related estimated densities are converging
uniformly at the best possible rate.
Proposition 6.2 Under A1-A6, for any closed subset C of So(FX,Z,I), we have al-
most surely sup(z,I)∈[z,z]×I |̂b(z, I)− b(z, I)| = O( logLL )
1
d+1 and |̂b − b| = O( logLL )
1
d+1 for
both the first and second price auctions. The pseudo values and pseudo probabilities
satisfy almost surely:
(i) sup
i,p,l
1C(Xipl, Zl, Il)|X̂ipl −Xipl| = O
(
(
logL
L
)
R+1
(2R+d+3)
)
(ii) sup
i,p,l
1C(Xipl, Zl, Il)|P̂ipl − Pipl| = O
(
(
logL
L
)
R+1
(2R+d+3)
)
in the first price auction and
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(i) sup
i,p,l
1C(Xipl, Zl, Il)|X̂ipl −Xipl| = 0
(ii) sup
i,p,l
1C(Xipl, Zl, Il)|P̂ipl − Pipl| = O
(
(
logL
L
)
R
(2R+d+1)
)
in the second price auction.
In the same way as the vector of pseudo private values is not sufficient to estimate
the CDFs of each bidders private values (on the contrary to GPV), the estimation of
conditional mean, variance or quantiles of a given bidder’s private values would also
require the joint use of the pseudo private values with the associated vector of pseudo
probabilities. We now state our main result. The study of uniform convergence is
restricted to inner closed subset of the support to avoid boundary effects.
Proposition 6.3 Suppose that A1-A6 hold, then (f̂X1|Z,I(.|., .), · · · , f̂Xn|Z,I(.|., .)) is
uniformly consistent as L→∞ with rate (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+3) on any inner compact
subset of the support of (fX1|Z,I(.|., .), · · · , fXn|Z,I(.|., .)) in the first price auction and
respectively the rate (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+1) in the second price auction.
In addition to establishing the uniform consistency of our multi-step estimator, we
show in the supplementary material that our estimation procedure of the conditional
density FX|Z,I(.|., .) in the first and second price auctions under anonymous data
reaches the asymptotic optimal rates. At first glance, it seems immediate since the
rates derived in proposition 6.3 correspond precisely to the rates derived by GPV
which were shown to be optimal when the data is not anonymous. However, the
optimality property derived in GPV has been obtained for the symmetric IPV model
while we are considering the asymmetric bidders.
Note that if the interest of the econometrician lies in the estimation of the distri-
butions FB∗|Z,I(.|., .), then, in the first price auction, our bandwidths are suboptimal
and the same bandwidths as those for the second price auction should be used. We
present the proof of Proposition 6.3 as it helps to identify the additional points
relative to GPV’s procedure and why it does not change the asymptotical rates of
convergence.
Proof We have f̂Xi|Z,I(x|z, I) = f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I)/f̂Z,I(z, I). Given the optimal
bandwidth choice for hfZ in assumption A6, we know that f̂Z,I(z, I) converges uni-
formly to fZ,I(z, I) at the rate (L/ logL)(R+1)/(2R+d+1) on any inner compact of its
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support. Because this rate is faster than that of the theorem (for both auction for-
mats) and fZ,I(z, I) is bounded away from 0 by assumption A3-(ii), it suffices to
show that f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) converges at the rate (
logL
L
)R/(2R+d+3) and ( logL
L
)R/(2R+d+1)
in the first and second price auctions respectively. We turn back that the way we
have decomposed the difference f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) − fXi,Z,I(x|z, I) in equation (17) and
analyze the convergence rate of the three error terms.
In the second price auction, the bandwidth hfXi,Z is optimal and thus leads to a
uniform convergence of f˜Xi,Z,I(x, z, I) to fXi,Z,I(x, z, I) at the rate (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+1)
in any inner compact of its support. In the first price auction, the suboptimal band-
width leads to the rate (L/ logL)R/(2R+d+3) as in GPV. Thus we are left with the first
two terms ε1 and ε2, the first one resulting explicitly from the anonymous nature of
the bids is new, whereas the second term appears already in GPV.
First consider the second price auction. Since X̂ipl = Xipl, the second term
vanishes and we are left with the first term
1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
L∑
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl
(P̂ipl − Pipl) ·KfXi,Z(
x−Xipl
hfXi,Z
,
z − Zl
hfXi,Z
) · 1(Il = I),
which is bounded by:
(
sup
p,l
1C(Xipl, Zl, Il)|P̂ipl − Pipl|
)
·
 1
Lhd+1fXi,Z
L∑
l=1
∑
p=1,··· ,nIl
|KfXi,Z(
x−Xipl
hfXi,Z
,
z − Zl
hfXi,Z
)| · 1(Il = I)
 .
The above term appearing in the bracket may be viewed as a kernel estimator,
and hence converges uniformly on C to ∑p=1,··· ,nI fXip,Z,I(x, z, I) · ∫ |KfXi,Z(x, z)|dxdz.
Thus this term stays bounded almost surely. Finally the difference f̂Xi,Z,I(x, z, I)−
fXi,Z,I(x, z, I) = O(logL/L)
R/(2R+d+1).
In the first price auction, similarly to GPV, a first-order Taylor expansion es-
tablishes that ε2 has the order O(logL/L)R/(2R+d+3), whereas the same argument
as above establishes that ε1 has the order O(logL/L)(R+1)/(2R+d+3). Thus with
anonymity, it is still the second error term that results from the gap between es-
timated and real private values that is the ‘binding’ term relative to the uniform
convergence rate. CQFD
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7 Monte Carlo Experiments
To illustrate the usefulness of our procedure, we conduct a limited Monte Carlo
study.18 To fit with realistic sizes of auction data, we consider L = 40 auctions,
each having at most 6 bidders. Our Monte Carlo experiments consist of respectively
200 and 5000 replications for our estimation and testing procedures for the second
price auction when the identity of the winner is observed. The true distribution
of private values FX is generated from the densities f on the support [0, 1] where
f(x) = (1 +  · (1− 2x)) · 10≤x≤1 ( is a parameter in [−1, 1]).
Estimation In Figure 2, which summarizes our results for the estimators of the
CDF of the weak bidders, the underlying (true) model is the asymmetric IPV model
with 3 (strong) bidders with  = −1
2
and 3 (weak) bidders with  = 1
2
. The true CDF
is displayed in plain red line. For the interval [0, 1], the median (full line), the 5 and
95 percentiles (dashed lines) and the 10 and 90 percentiles (dots) of our estimates of
the CDF of the weak bidders are displayed in black. This gives the (pointwise) 80%
and 90% confidence intervals. Figure 2 also displays in blue lines the corresponding
results under the ‘naive’ estimation procedure that drops the bids that are anonymous
in the data set. In the first-price auction, the ‘naive’ approach would correspond to
treat the data as the one resulting from a Dutch auction which is identified under
the independence assumption, see Athey and Haile [2] for identification where results
18Practical details on the implementation and additional Monte Carlo simulations are reported in
the supplementary material. Programs are written in Mathematica and are available upon request.
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from the competing risk literature are applied and Paarsch and Hong [30] p.153-155
for natural estimators that are asymptotically consistent.19 The results are striking.
By keeping only the highest bid, the ‘naive’ approach can not draw any inference on
the lowest tail of the distribution for which bids are practically never recorded with
6 bidders. This is especially true for the weak bidders for which the estimator is too
noisy to have any practical interest and is also seriously biased for about one half
of the distribution. On the contrary, our estimation procedure does a good job: the
median of the estimates perfectly matches the true curve and the 80% confidence
intervals are much smaller. In a nutshell, our procedure outperforms the ‘naive’
approach for the whole support of the distribution, though it is less striking at the
upper tail of the distribution.
The simulations reported in Figure 3 are devoted to a kind of robustness check.
Our ‘sophisticated’ estimation approach and the ‘naive’ approach are both relying on
the independence assumption. We consider a departure from this assumption: the
underlying (true) model is a symmetric correlated PV model with 6 bidders.20 The
legend is the same as for Figure 2. The results in Figure 3 provide another argument
in favor of our estimation procedure compared to the ‘naive’ approach. If we wrongly
assume that the sampling scheme is an independent asymmetric model whereas it is
indeed a symmetric correlated model, then our procedure leads to accurate unbiased
estimates. On the contrary, the ‘naive’ approach remains flawed: it does not solely
fail to give practically useful confidence intervals for the lower tail of the distribution
but it is also strongly biased on all the support since it is mislead by the way it
exploits the independence assumption -this bias is not a byproduct of the limited
sample size as it can be checked with bigger sample sizes. This contrasts with our
methodology which implicitly switches to the estimation of the symmetric PV model
when bids are positively correlated. By taking the real part of the estimated roots in
equation (11), our procedure (at least partially) drops the use of the independence
assumption when we estimate complex roots as it happens with positive correlation.21
19We emphasize that the terminology ‘naive’ refers to the way anonymous bids are thrown away.
20Bidders’ values are constructed in the following way. They correspond to a weighted sum
between a common shock and an idiosyncratic shock that is associated to each bidder. Shocks are
supposed to be independent and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The weight on the common shock
ρ is fixed here to ρ = 0.25 such that bidders’ values are positively correlated.
21A rigorous formalization of this point is left for future research.
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A reader familiar with the numerical analysis literature which analyzes the sen-
sitivity of the roots of a polynomial with respect to small perturbations to its coef-
ficients could legitimately have serious doubts about the practical relevance of our
estimation procedure.22 Such issues do not seem to prevent the usefulness of our
analysis. Note that our application involves polynomials of low degree. Unreported
simulations with polynomials of degree 3 show that our methodology still work.
Tests for symmetry For the testing procedure, both the number of bidders
and the choice for  vary, e.g. in table 3 the third column ‘1/2’ and the two last
rows correspond to 3 bidders: 1 (strong) with  = −1 and 2 (weak) bidders with
 = 1. Moreover the simulations are also reported for L = 200. The power properties
of our test are summarized in Table 3 and are illustrating the theoretical results of
section 5: the comparative statics of the power with respect to the data structure
that were relying on asymptotic approximations are confirmed by our simulations
and the crucial importance of the degree of asymmetry, e.g. from  = ±1
2
to  = ±1,
the power goes from 0.20 to 0.78 for L = 40.
22Wilkinson’s polynomial u→∏20k=1 (u− k) is the classic example where a perturbation of 2−23
in the second leading coefficient of a polynomial whose roots are distant from unity leads to first-
order perturbations of the roots: the root at x = 20 grows to x ≈ 20.8 and the roots at x = 18 and
x = 19 collide into a double root. See Gautschi [9] and Mosier [27] for more on this topic.
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Structure 1/1 1/2 1/3 2/2 3/3
Range of L 40 200 40 200 40 200 40 200 40 200
Degree of asymmetry
Distribution,  = ±12
share of p-values < 10% 0.20 0.44 0.16 0.31 0.15 0.21 0.16 0.31 0.14 0.25
share of p-values < 5% 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.07 0.14
Distribution,  = ±1
share of p-values < 10% 0.78 1.00 0.54 0.98 0.30 0.67 0.57 0.99 0.41 0.91
share of p-values < 5% 0.67 1.00 0.39 0.94 0.18 0.50 0.43 0.97 0.27 0.82
Table 3: Monte Carlo Results. Test based on Means. 5000 replications for each experiment.
8 Conclusion
This work has been limited to the IPV model with risk neutral bidders, no re-
serve price and a complete set of bids. All our analysis of the first-price auction
can be adapted to risk averse bidders under a conditional quantile restriction and a
parametrization of bidders’ utility function following Campo et al. [6]. As in GPV,
our analysis can also be adapted to a binding reserve price provided that we are
prepared to assume that the number of potential bidders is constant. Naturally,
identification is obtained only for the truncated distribution of types that are above
the reserve price. More involved is the extension of our methodology with incomplete
sets of bids or with an unobserved (exogenous) set of participants, whose develop-
ments are left for further ongoing research.23 E.g. in the second price auction, we
can be reluctant to propose identification and estimation methods that are relying
on the observation of the complete set of bids, in particular on the observation of the
highest bid which may remain unobserved. Moreover, this excludes any direct appli-
cation for the English auction. Let us briefly precise the different issues: first how to
adapt our own estimation methodology whose central step involves the computation,
for any x, of the vector (FB∗i (x))i=1,··· ,n as a function of the vector (F
(i:i)
B (x))i=1,··· ,n,
a problem which has been shown to be related to the computation of the roots of
a polynomial as a function of its coefficients under the key assumption that private
values are independently distributed ; second how to deal more generally with iden-
tification, estimation and testing using alternatives routes that are exploiting the full
joint distribution of the order-statistics FB.
23With incomplete sets of bids, assuming independence seems the unique ‘natural’ identifica-
tion route for nonparametric approaches. E.g. Theorem 4 of Athey and Haile [2] show that the
symmetric affiliated value model is not identified.
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According to our methodology, each ordered statistic leads to an equation lead-
ing thus to an n equations system, whereas we face n unknowns. Thus the least
unobserved bidding statistic breaks the procedure. There are two routes to restore
it. First, to impose more symmetry by assuming that some bidders are symmet-
ric: it corresponds to a reduction of the number of unknowns. Second, to exploit
some exogenous variations in the number of bidders: it corresponds to an expansion
of the number of equations. Under some mild restriction on the asymmetric IPV
model, the way we exploit independence could be usefully adapted in further re-
search to obtain identification with an incomplete set of anonymous bids and which
goes beyond the symmetric IPV model. However, such additional assumptions are
not necessary for identification. Methods that are relying on the joint-distribution
of two order-statistics (and that lies outside the scope of this work) allows identifi-
cation and are providing an alternative route. Nevertheless, doing so is at some cost
since it will require the estimation of joint-distributions and add at least one sup-
plementary dimension with respect to the estimation of the order-statistics. On the
contrary, our nonparametric procedure under anonymous data does not involve any
additional dimension with respect to the standard ones under independent values,
i.e. dimension d+ 1 where d is the dimension of the covariates usually reduced to a
single dimensional index, as it is reflected by the same convergence rates.24
Our approach can also be used for alternative asymmetric auction models with
independent private signals as the one developed by Landsberger et al. [19] where
the ranking of bidders’ private valuations is common knowledge among bidders (but
possibly not to the econometrician). A promising avenue for research, which was the
initial motivation of this work, is the structural analysis of models with shill bidding
as developed by Lamy [17, 18]. With private values, models with shill bidding are
strategically equivalent to models with a secret reserve price. It differs only from the
econometrician point of view: in the latter, she distinguishes a submitted bid from
the reserve price which facilitates the estimation as in Li and Perrigne [22], whereas,
in the former, the strategic bidding activity of the seller is indistinguishable from
24The idea of our methodology could be also useful for environments with partial anonymity and
incomplete sets of bids, e.g. if the identity of the winner is observed and all losing bids are observed
anonymously in the second price auction. Komarova [14] shows that the asymmetric IPV model is
identified through the identity of the winner and the amount of the highest losing bid and proposes
an estimation procedure. If additional losing bids are observed, adaptations of our methodology
could be useful to exploit them.
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any other bid.
The ideas sustaining our methodology could be useful more generally beyond
auction environments for applications as imperfect matching between data set, pos-
sible new anonymous designs in experimental economics or the design of surveys for
sensitive attributes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Under observability of bidders’ identities and in the first price auction, Li et al.
[23] shows that the symmetric APV model is identified whereas Campo et al. [7]
extends this result to the asymmetric APV model. Let us see why Li et al. [23]’s proof
remains valid under anonymity whereas Campo et al. [7]’s proof does not. The main
step to obtain identification is the equilibrium equation (2) that express bidder i’s
private value xi as a function of his bid bi and the CDF FB∗−i|B∗i (.|.) of the highest bid
among his opponents conditional on his bid. Under observed identities, it is possible
to obtain the full distribution of the vector of private valuations X since the CDFs
FB∗−i|B∗i (.|.) are identified. Under anonymity, we observe only a weighted average of
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those CDFs:
∑n
i=1 FB∗−i|B∗i (b
′|b) · Prob(B∗i = b|∃j B∗j = b,B∗k ≤ b′ for k 6= j), which
corresponds to the probability that the bid of the highest opponent of a bidder
with an equilibrium bid b is smaller than b′. This prevents an immediate use of
the equation (2) in the general case. However, in the symmetric case this average
corresponds also to FB∗−i|B∗i (b
′|b) = 1
n
·∑ni=1 FB∗−i|B∗i (b′|b) and the joint distribution
of private signals is thus identified as for the second price auction where bids equal
private values. Finally the symmetric APV model is identified in both formats.
For any strictly affiliated distribution of bids FB∗ , let us construct a continuum
of local perturbations F γB∗ that are strictly affiliated, lead to the same observable
distribution FB and that differ (up to a permutation) from FB∗ . This will prove
our non-identification result for the second price auction. If there were a one-to-one
correspondence between signals and bids joint distributions in the first price auction
then our non-identification result would extend immediately from the second price
to the first price auction. Such a result is not available to the best of our knowledge
and the technicalities of the extension of our proof to the first price auction are then
relegated in the supplementary material.
Let φ(.) be a smoothed version of the indicator function on the interval [0, 1]:
φ(x) > 0 if and only if x ∈ [0, 1], ∫ φ = 1 and φ is continuously differentiable. Let
x1, x2 > x1 in (x, x), take  < min{x2 − x1, x1 − x, x− x2} and define:
c(x; , i, j) ≡
(
φ(
xi − x2

)φ(
xj − x1

)− φ(xj − x
2

)φ(
xi − x1

)
) ∏
k 6=i,j
φ(
xk − x

).
The function c shifts probability weight from some regions to others, in particular∫ ∫
c = 0. Define fγX(.) ≡ fX(.) + γ · c(.; , i, j). If γ is sufficiently small, then
fγX is a PDF and the affiliation property still holds (
∂2log(fγX(x))
∂xi∂xj
= ∂
2log(fX(x))
∂xi∂xj
+ o(γ)
uniformly on (x, x)). Moreover, it leads to the same distribution of bids as the one
resulting from FX since the shift is between regions that are not distinguishable under
anonymous bids. Finally, we have to check that fγX(.) and fX(.) do not coincide up
to a permutation for a continuum of γ. By coincidence, for a given γ, there may
exist a permutation pi such that fγX(x1, · · · , xn) = fX(xpi(1), · · · , xpi(n)) for any x. Our
construction is valid for any γ which is sufficiently small, thus an infinite number
of γ are potential candidates. On the other hand, there exists only a finite number
of permutations and a contradiction is raised if fγX(.) coincides with fX(.) up to
the same permutation for two different γ’s since it would imply that the function
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c(.; , i, j) is null.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
The proposition results from lemma A.1, a corollary of Yang [41]’s Theorem
2.1, and lemma A.2 which states how the number of distinct roots of a derivative
polynomial P (i) is linked to the root structure of the original polynomial when the
original polynomial has only real roots.
Lemma A.1 (Corollary of Theorem 2.1 in Yang [41]) A polynomial with real
roots P has r(P ) distinct real roots if and only if ∆(P, k) > 0 for k ≤ r(P ) and
∆(P, k) = 0 for k > r(P ).
Lemma A.2 The polynomial with real roots P has the root structure (k1, · · · , kr(P ))
if and only if the number of distinct roots of the polynomials P (i) is given by ρ(i) =
n− i−∑r(P )j=1 (kj − 1− i)+ for i = 1, · · · , n− 2.
Proof The necessity part comes from Rolle’s theorem: derivation creates at
least one root between each adjacent roots, while the roots that had a multiplicity
ki strictly greater than one remains a root with multiplicity ki − 1. There is no
additional roots other than the ones identified above for the derivative polynomial
and the new roots have multiplicity one since the number of identified roots (counted
with their multiplicity) is n−1. Finally the number of distinct roots of the derivative
polynomial is r(P )−1+∑r(P )i=1 1[ki > 1]. Thus we have proved the necessity part for
ρ(1). The result for ρ(2), · · · , ρ(n− 2) follows by induction of the above argument.
Consider two polynomials P and Q with two distinct root structures, respectively
denoted by (k1, · · · , kr(P )) and (k′1, · · · , k′r(Q)). We also use the convention that ki = 0
(k′i = 0) for i > r(P ) (i > r(Q)). Denote by i∗ = max {j|kj 6= k′j}. Without loss
of generality take kj > k′j. The number of distinct roots of the polynomial Q(k
′
i∗−1)
equals to n−k′i∗+1−
∑r(Q)
j=1 (k
′
j − k′i∗)+, which is equal to n−k′i∗+1−
∑i∗
j=1 (k
′
j − k′i∗),
which is finally strictly bigger than n−ki∗+1−
∑i∗
j=1 (kj − k′i∗), the number of distinct
roots of the polynomial P (k′i∗−1) (after noting that
∑i∗
j=1 kj =
∑i∗
j=1 k
′
j). Thus we
obtain that the number of distinct roots of the (k′i∗ − 1)th derivative polynomials
differ. CQFD
Applying lemma A.1 to the polynomials {P (i)}i=1,··· ,n−2, whose numbers of dis-
tinct roots are given by lemma A.2, gives Proposition 5.1.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.3
To alleviate notations we assume here that KFBp|Z = KfZ = K and hFBp|Z =
hfZ = h. The proof can be immediately adapted to the general case. In the following
let x ∨ y denote the maximum of x and y. Let Khl (z) and Khli,lj denote respectively
h−dK(Zl−z
h
) and h−dK(
Zlj−Zli
h
). By carefully plugging the expressions
(F̂ (1:1)B,Z (b, z))
2 =
L−2
n2
L∑
l2,l3=1
n∑
p2,p3=1
1(Bp2l2 ≤ b)1(Bp3l3 ≤ b)Khl2(z)Khl3(z)
F̂
(2:2)
B,Z (b, z)f̂Z(z) =
L−2
n(n− 1)
L∑
l2,l3=1
n∑
p2,p3=1
p2 6=p3
1(Bp2l2 ∨Bp3l2 ≤ b) + 1(Bp2l3 ∨Bp3l3 ≤ b)
2
Khl2(z)K
h
l3(z)
into the expression of Ĥ in equation (20), our estimator of the discriminant can be
expressed as a U-statistic:
Ĥ = L−3
L∑
l1=1
L∑
l2=1
L∑
l3=1
mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)
with Yl = (Bl, Zl) and where the kernel of the U-statistic mL(., ., .) is given by
mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3) =
1
n3
∑n
p1,p2,p3=1
1(Bp2l2 ≤ Bp1l1)1(Bp3l3 ≤ Bp1l1)Khl1,l2Khl1,l3
− 1
2n2(n−1)
∑n
p1,p2,p3=1
p2 6=p3
[1(Bp2l2 ∨Bp3l2 ≤ Bp1l1) + 1(Bp2l3 ∨Bp3l3 ≤ Bp1l1)]Khl1,l2Khl1,l3 .
Note that the kernel of the U-statistic depends explicitly on L through the band-
width h. The limit variance calculation deserves thus additional care.25 Newey and
McFadden [29] show how to deal with such a nuisance for U-statistic with kernels of
degree 2. Here the problem is similar up to the point that we face a U-statistic of
degree 3 and thus we have to generalize lemma 8.4 in Newey and McFadden [29] for
U-statistics with kernels of degree 3. Let m1L(Yl) = EYl2 ,Yl3 [mL(Yl, Yl2 , Yl3)], m
2
L(Yl) =
EYl1 ,Yl3 [mL(Yl1 , Yl, Yl3)],m
3
L(Yl) = EYl1 ,Yl2 [mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl)] and µ = EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)].
Lemma A.3 Generalization of lemma 8.4 in Newey and McFadden [29]
If Y1, Y2, · · · are i.i.d. then 2µ+ L−3∑Ll1=1∑Ll2=1∑Ll3=1mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)− · · ·
· · ·L−1∑Ll=1m1L(Yl) +m2L(Yl) +m3L(Yl) = 1L .OL{(EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)||2])1/2
· · ·+ EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl2)||] + EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl2)||] + · · ·
· · ·+ EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl1)||] + EYl1 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl1)||]}.
25See Lee [21] for a detailed exposition of the variance calculation for standard U-statistics.
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Proof As in [29], by replacingmL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3) bymL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)−µ it can be as-
sumed w.l.o.g. that µ = 0. The term L−3PLl1,l2,l3=1mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3 )−L−1PLl=1 `m1L(Yl) +m2L(Yl) +m3L(Yl)´
is equal to L−3PLl1,l2,l3=1 ˆmL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3 )−m1L(Yl1 )−m2L(Yl2 )−m3L(Yl3 )˜ which can be written
as the sum T1 + T2 + T3 where the first term T1 corresponds to the case where the
indices l1, l2, l3 in the triple sum are all distinct, the second term T2 corresponds to
the cases where two indices coincide and the third term T3 corresponds to the cases
where l1 = l2 = l3. The third term is of the order OL{(EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3 )||] +
EYl1
[||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl1 )||])/L2}. The second term is of the order OL{(EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl2 )||] +
EYl1 ,Yl2
[||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl2 )||] + EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl1 )||] + EYl1 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl1 )||])/L}. As in [29], we
work with E[T 21 ].
T 21 = L
−6∑L
u1,u2,u3=1
ui 6=uj
∑L
v1,v2,v3=1
vi 6=vj
(
mL(Yu1 , Yu2 , Yu3)−m1L(Yu1)−m2L(Yu2)−m3L(Yu3)
)×
× (mL(Yv1 , Yv2 , Yv3)−m1L(Yv1)−m2L(Yv2)−m3L(Yv3)) .
The sum can be divided according to the number of common elements between the
sets U = {u1, u2, u3} and V = {v1, v2, v3}. Let S(U,V) = #(U ∩V). If S(U,V) ≤ 1,
the expectation of the term inside the sum is null. Note that the number of 6-uple
(u1, u2, u3, v1, v2, v3) ∈ [1, L]6 such that S(U,V) = 2 (respectively = 3) is of the
order OL(L4) (resp. OL(L3)). Note also that both EYu1 ,Yu2 ,Yu3 [||mL(Yu1 , Yu2 , Yu3) −
m1L(Yu1) −m2L(Yu2) −m3L(Yu3)||2] and EYu1 ,Yu2 ,Yu3 ,Yv1 [||(mL(Yu1 , Yu2 , Yu3) −m1L(Yu1) −
m2L(Yu2)−m3L(Yu3))×(mL(Yv1 , Yu2 , Yu3)−m1L(Yv1)−m2L(Yu2)−m3L(Yu3))||] are of the order
of OL(EYu1 ,Yu2 ,Yu3 [||mL(Yu1 , Yu2 , Yu3))||2]). The term in E[T 21 ] coming from S(U,V) = 3
is then of the order EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)||2]/L3 while the term coming from
S(U,V) = 2 is then of the order EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)||2]/L2. We thus obtain that
E[T 21 ] = OL(EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3)||2]/L2) and then T1 = OL(EYl1 ,Yl2 ,Yl3 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl3 )||2]/L2).
The lemma is obtained by gathering all those terms. CQFD
Below, we repeatedly use that EYl [g(Bl, Zl)Khl (z)] = EYl [g(Bl, Zl)|Zl = z] ·
fZ(z) + oL(1) for any bounded function g as it is implied from Bochner’s lemma.
EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl2)||], EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl2)||],
EYl1 ,Yl2 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl2 , Yl1)||] and EYl1 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl1)||] are all of the same order
as OL(1).26 We now move to the calculation of mjL(Yl1) for j = 1, 2, 3 and of µ.
26Note that the dependence in the bandwidths is removed by averaging over the full support of the
terms that appear in the kernels in the expression of mL(., ., .). A term as EYl1 [||mL(Yl1 , Yl1 , Yl1)||]
may give the wrong impression that we are averaging over a diagonal and not the full support.
However, remind that kernels appear only through the variable Zl.
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m1L(Yl) = EYl2 ,Yl3
[mL(Yl, Yl2 , Yl3 )] = EYl2
[EYl3
[mL(Yl, Yl2 , Yl3 )]]
= − 1
2n2(n−1)EYl2 [
Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
“
1(B∗i2l2 ∨B∗i3l2 ≤ B∗i1l) + FB∗i2 |Z(B
∗
i1l
|Zl) · FB∗
i3
|Z(B∗i1l|Zl)
”
·Khl,l2 · fZ(Zl)]
+ 1
n3
EYl2
[
Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
1(B∗i2l2 ≤ B∗i1l) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l
|Zl) ·Khl,l2 · fZ(Zl)] + oL(1)
= − 1
2n2(n−1)
 Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
2 · FB∗
i2
|Z(B∗i1l|Zl) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l
|Zl)
!
· (fZ(Zl))2
+ 1
n3
“Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
FB∗
i2
|Z(B∗i1l|Zl) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l
|Zl)
”
· (fZ(Zl))2 + oL(1)
= 1
n
Pn
i1=1
(F
(1:1)
B,Z (B
∗
i1l
, Zl)
2 − F (2:2)B,Z (B∗i1l, Zl) · fZ(Zl)) + oL(1) =
1
n
Pn
i1=1
∆(PB∗
i1l
,Zl
, 2) + oL(1).
m2L(Yl) = m
3
L(Yl) = EYl1 ,Yl3
[mL(Yl1 , Yl, Yl3 )] = EYl1
[EYl3
[mL(Yl1 , Yl, Yl3 )]]
= − 1
2n2(n−1)EYl1 [
Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
“
1(B∗i2l ∨B∗i3l ≤ B∗i1l1 ) + FB∗i2 |Z(B
∗
i1l1
|Zl1 ) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l1
|Zl1 )
”
·Khl1,l · fZ(Zl1 )]
+ 1
n3
EYl1
[
Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
1(B∗i2l ≤ B∗i1l1 ) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l1
|Zl1 ) ·Khl1,l · fZ(Zl1 )] + oL(1)
= − 1
2n2(n−1)
 Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
EYl1
[1(B∗i2l ∨B∗i3l ≤ B∗i1l1 ) + FB∗i2 |Z(B
∗
i1l1
|Zl) · FB∗
i3
|Z(B∗i1l1 |Zl)|Zl1 = Zl]
!
· [fZ(Zl)]2
+ 1
n3
“Pn
i1,i2,i3=1
EYl1
[1(B∗i2l ≤ B∗i1l1 ) · FB∗i3 |Z(B
∗
i1l1
|Zl)|Zl1 = Zl]
”
· [fZ(Zl)]2 + oL(1)
= −
 
1
2n(n−1)
Pn
i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
R∞
B∗
i2l
∨B∗
i3l
f
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl)db+ 12n
Pn
i1=1
EYl1
[F
(2:2)
B|Z (B
∗
i1l1
|Zl)|Zl1 = Zl]
!
· [fZ(Zl)]2
+ 1
n
Pn
i2=1
„R∞
B∗
i2l
F
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl)f
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl)db
«
· [fZ(Zl)]2 + oL(1)
= −
 
1
2n(n−1)
Pn
i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
(1− F (1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l
∨B∗i3l|Zl)) +
1
2
R∞
−∞ F
(2:2)
B|Z (b|Zl)f
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl)db
!
· [fZ(Zl)]2
+ 1
2n
Pn
i2=1
(1− (F (1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l2
|Zl))2) · [fZ(Zl)]2 + oL(1)
=
 
1
2n(n−1)
Pn
i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l
∨B∗i3l|Zl)−
1
2n
Pn
i2=1
(F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l
|Zl))2
!
· [fZ(Zl)]2
+ 1
2
R∞
−∞ F
(2:2)
B|Z (b|Zl)f
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl)db · [fZ(Zl)]2 + oL(1)
µ = EYl [m
1
L(Yl)] = EYl [m
2
L(Yl)] = EYl [m
3
L(Yl)] = H+ oL(1).
P3
j=1m
j
L(Yl)− 3H =
0BB@ 1n(n− 1)
nX
i2,i3=1
i2 6=i3
F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l
∨B∗i3l|Zl)−
1
n
nX
i2=1
F
(2:2)
B|Z (B
∗
i2l
|Zl) + C(Zl)
1CCA
| {z }
K(Yl), which is independent of L
·[fZ(Zl)]2 + oL(1)
where C(Zl) =
∫∞
−∞ F
(2:2)
B|Z (b|Zl)f (1:1)B|Z (b|Zl)db − 3H[fZ(Zl)]2 . After gathering all those
terms, we have from lemma A.3:
√
L.(Ĥ − H) = √L.L−1∑Ll=1K(Yl)[fZ(Zl)]2 +
oL(1). We have EBl [K(Yl)|Zl = z] = 0 for all z such that fZ(z) > 0 which
gives that VarYl [K(Yl)[fZ(Zl)]2] = EZl [VarBl [K(Yl)|Zl] · [fZ(Zl)]4]. The variable
K(Yl) is not a constant with respect to Bl which guarantees the asymptotic nor-
mality of the variable
√
L.(Ĥ − H) to a centered normal distribution with variance
Σ2 = EZl [VarBl [K(Yl)|Zl] · [fZ(Zl)]4] + oL(1). Finally we are left with the analytical
expression for the variance under H0 which is done by straightforward though tedious
calculation. Under H0 note that we have F
(2:2)
B|Z (b|z) = [F (1:1)B|Z (b|z)]2.
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VarBl [K(Yl)|Zl] =
= 4
45n︷ ︸︸ ︷
VarBl [
1
n
n∑
i1=1
(F (1:1)B|Z (B
∗
i1l|Zl))2] +
=
4(n−2)
45n(n−1)+
1
9n(n−1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
VarBl [
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i1,i2=1
i1 6=i2
F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i1l ∨B∗i2l|Zl)]
+ 2.CovBl [
1
n
n∑
i1=1
(F (1:1)B|Z (B
∗
i1l|Zl))2,
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i1,i2=1
i1 6=i2
F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i1l ∨B∗i2l|Zl)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− 8
45n
.
Throughout this calculation we use that
∫∞
−∞ (F
(1:1)
B|Z (b|Zl))α · d[(F (1:1)B|Z (b|Zl))β] =
β
α+β
. The calculation of the second term uses also that EBl [F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i1l
∨ B∗i2l|Zl) ·
F
(1:1)
B|Z (B
∗
i1l
∨ B∗i3l|Zl)] = 715 . The asymptotic expression of the variance under H0 is
obtained by gathering all those terms: Σ2 = EZl [[fZ(Zl)]
4]
45n(n−1) . In the special case without
any covariates it reduces to 1
45n(n−1) .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6.1
In their proposition 1, GPV obtains the same properties for the CDFs FB∗i |Z,I
instead of FBp|Z,I. From (3) and (4), we obtain that any CDF FBp|Z,I(b, z, I) can
be expressed as a linear combination of terms which are product of FB∗i |Z,I(b, z, I),
i.e. as a continuous function of the CDFs FB∗i |Z,I. The CDF FB∗i |Z,I have the desired
smoothness properties on the set S0(FBnI |Z,I) \ {b(z, I, i)}: on the set S0(FB∗i |Z,I), it
comes from GPV, whereas FB∗i |Z,I is equal to 1 above b(z, I, i) and is thus C
∞. Thus
all the regularity properties (iii-v) that are valid for FB∗i |Z,I are still valid for FBp|Z,I
if the points {b(z, I, i)}i∈I have been appropriately removed. The image of a closed
interval by a continuous function is a closed interval. Thus (i) holds also for FBp|Z,I.
Finally we are left with (ii). Note the difference between the similar point in GPV
which holds for the whole support and not only for a closed subset of the So(FBp|Z,I)
as above. By deriving (4) and (3), we obtain an another expression of fBp|Z,I(b|z, I)
as a function of FB∗i |Z,I(b|z, I) and fB∗i |Z,I(b|z, I):
fBp|Z,I(b, z, I) =
1
(p− 1)!(nI − p− 1)!
·
∑
pi∈ΣI
p−1∏
k=1
FB∗
pi(k)
|Z,I(b, z, I) · fB∗
pi(p)
|Z,I(b, z, I) ·
nI∏
k=p+1
(1− FB∗
pi(k)
|Z,I(b, z, I))

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Thus we obtain that fBp|Z,I(b, z, I) is strictly positive on So(FBn|Z,I).27
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6.2
We write the proof for the first price auction, the arguments are easily adapted
for the second price auction. It is closely related to GPV and uses intensively some
rates of uniform convergence derived by GPV. We follow their proof very carefully
and focus only on the two new ingredients. First, their proof is based on the uniform
rates of convergence for the CDF, the PDF and also the boundaries estimators of
the variable B∗ that is observed by the econometrician. Here we do not observe B∗
but only the vector of order statistics B. Second, the pseudo probabilities are a new
ingredient that do not appear in GPV.
The first issue is then to prove that the same uniform rates of convergence are still
valid for B∗ though it is not observed. Nevertheless, the uniform rates of convergence
they obtained for B∗ are still valid under anonymity for the variable B that is
observed and with our similar choices for the kernels and the bandwidth parameters.
Contrary to GPV’s analysis which is restricted to a symmetric environment, the
observed variable B is here multidimensional: it does not modify their analysis
which immediately adapts since our procedure is based only on the estimation of the
one dimensional densities FBp,Z,I(b, z, I).
First the bidding supports of the bidders are coinciding with the support of
the order statistics. Thus all the results for the estimator of the support of B are
immediately converted into results for B∗. From GPV (lemma B2), we obtain the
following uniform rate of convergence for the kernel estimators F̂B,Z,I(b, z, I) and
f̂B,Z,I(b, z, I) on any inner closed compact subset of the bidding support, denoted by
C(B).
sup
(b,z,I)⊂C(B)
||F̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I)− FB,Z,I(b, z, I)||0 = O(
logL
L
)
R+1
2R+d+2
sup
(b,z,I)⊂C(B)
||f̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I)− fB,Z,I(b, z, I)||0 = O(
logL
L
)
R+1
2R+d+3
In GPV, the corresponding uniform rates of convergence are obtained for the
bidding distributions and densities F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) and f̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) since bidders’
identities are observed. However, we establish that the function mapping the vector
27Note that fBp|Z,I(b, z, I) is null at the lower bound b = b(z, I, p) for p > 1 (respectively at the
upper bound b = b(z, I, p) for p < n).
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of the order statistics CDF (FBp,Z,I(b, z, I))p=1,··· ,nI into (FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I))i∈I is contin-
uously differentiable on C(B) with a Jacobian matrix of full rank. This function
is the composition of two functions. First, the function mapping the vector of the
order statistics CDF (FBp,Z,I(b, z, I))p=1,··· ,nI into (F
(r:r)
Bp,Z,I
(b, z, I))p=1,··· ,nI is a linear
invertible function (the related matrix is triangular with the coefficient 1 on the
diagonal). Second, the Jacobian matrix of the function mapping the vector of the
order statistics CDF (F (r:r)Bp,Z,I(b, z, I))p=1,··· ,nI into (FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I))i=1∈I is well-defined
and of full rank on C(B) as shown below in lemma A.4. We thus conclude that the
uniform rate of convergence that holds for (FBp,Z,I(b, z, I))p=1,··· ,nI remains valid for
(FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I))i∈I .
Lemma A.4 The Jacobian matrix of Υ at any point (an−1, · · · , a0) such that (ω1, · · · , ωn) =
Υ(an−1, · · · , a0) and with ω1 ≥ · · · ≥ ωn is well-defined if and only if ω1 > · · · > ωn.
Proof The transpose of the jacobian matrix of the map Υ−1 at ω = (ω1, · · · , ωn)
is given by:
Jω =
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
1
P
j1 6=1 ωj1 . .
P
j1,·,jr,jk 6=1,jk 6=jk′
Q
jk∈{j1,·,jr} ωjk . .
Q
j 6=1 ωj
1
P
j1 6=2 ωj1 . .
P
j1,·,jr,jk 6=2,jk 6=jk′
Q
jk∈{j1,·,jr} ωjk . .
Q
j 6=2 ωj
. . . . . . . .
1
P
j1 6=l ωj1 . .
P
j1,·,jr,jk 6=l,jk 6=jk′
Q
jk∈{j1,·,jr} ωjk . .
Q
j 6=l ωj
. . . . . . . .
1
P
j1 6=n ωj1 . .
P
j1,·,jr,jk 6=n,jk 6=jk′
Q
jk∈{j1,·,jr} ωjk . .
Q
j 6=n ωj
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
.
We then show that the determinant of this matrix is equal to the determinant of
the Vandermonde matrix:
Vω =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
1 ω1 . . ω
k−1
1 . . ω
n−1
1
1 ω2 . . ω
k−1
2 . . ω
n−1
2
. . . . . . . .
1 ωl . . ω
k−1
l . . ω
n−1
l
. . . . . . . .
1 ωn . . ω
k−1
n . . ω
n−1
n
1CCCCCCCCCCA
.
The matrix Vω and Jω are also denoted by Vω = [V1, · · · , Vn] and Jω = [J1, · · · , Jn].
The argument for establishing that det(Jω) = det(Vω) relies on n successive transfor-
mations that leave the determinant invariant and that go from matrix Vω to matrix
Jω. Denote by Sk the sum
∑
j1,··· ,jr,jk 6=jk′
∏
jk∈{j1,·,jr} ωjk (with the convention S0 = 1)
and respectively by 1 and Iω the vector and the diagonal matrix:
1 =
0BBB@
1
...
1
1CCCA , Iω =
0BBB@
ω1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 ωn
1CCCA .
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By means of the recursive relation Sk−1×1 = Jk+Iω×Jk−1, for k = 1, · · · , n+1 (with
the convention that Jn+1 is the null vector), we easily derive a kind of Newton-Girard
formula for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n:
Jk =
k∑
i=1
(−1)i+1Sk−iVi. (21)
From matrix Vω, if we successively replace the column k (from k = n to k =
1) by the column
∑k
i=1 (−1)i+1Sk−iVi, the determinant is preserved at each step
whereas equation (21) guarantees that the final matrix is Jω. The determinant of
the Vandermonde matrix is known to be equal to det(Vω) =
∏
1≤i<j≤n (ωi − ωj)2
(see [4] p. 104-105). We conclude after noting that determinants are invariant by
transposition and that the regularity of the Jacobian matrix of a function and its
inverse are equivalent. CQFD
From equation (10) and (12), we have the following bounds for the densities on
C(B) where, asymptotically, the terms (F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I) − F̂B∗j ,Z,I(b, z, I)), j ∈ I \ {i}
are bounded away from zero:
||f̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)− fB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)||0 ≤ C1 · ||f̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I)− fBp,Z,I(b, z, I)||0
+ C2 · ||F̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)− FB∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I)||0
Thus the uniform convergence rate that holds for f̂Bp,Z,I(b, z, I) remains also valid
for f̂B∗i ,Z,I(b, z, I). In any inner compact subset of the support, the pseudo values
can be expressed as a continuous differentiable function of f̂B∗i ,Z,I and F̂B∗i ,Z,I, i =
1, · · · , nI . Furthermore, it is the rate of convergence of f̂B∗i ,Z,I which sets the rate of
convergence of X̂ipl to Xipl in any inner compact subset of the support whereas the
estimator for F̂B∗i ,Z,I is converging at a faster rate.
The remaining issues are the consistency and the uniform rates of convergence of
P̂ipl. From equations (15), the pseudo probabilities can be expressed as a continuous
differentiable function of f̂B∗i ,Z,I (i = 0, · · · , nI) in any inner compact subset of the
support (the denominator stays bounded away from zero). Then P̂ipl is an asymp-
totically unbiased estimator of Pipl and converges uniformly at the same rate as the
one for X̂ipl.
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